International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

Human immunodeficiency virus risk: is it possible to dissuade people from having unsafe sex?

Summary. The cumulative number of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infections worldwide has reached 60 million in little over 30 years. HIV continues to spread despite a detailed understanding of the manner in which it spreads and measures which can prevent spread. Some governments have been highly successful in containing the spread of HIV through blood products and from mother to child and among injecting drug users. Lack of political will, lack of resources or challenges to widely accepted scientific evidence have held back similar interventions in other countries. It has proved much more difficult to reduce the sexual transmission of HIV in both high and low income countries. A wide range of strategies has been identified but it remains unclear which strategies deserve priority and what methods of promoting them have the greatest effect. There is ample evidence that awareness of HIV and changes in sexual behaviour have occurred widely but the penetration of information remains poor in some vulnerable groups especially adolescents and women in poorer countries. Further obstacles face those who have information about the risk. The subordinate position of women and a desire for large families are important obstacles to condom negotiation and use. Urbanization, poverty, conflict and declining public services all exacerbate unsafe sexual behaviour. We argue that so-called 'structural' interventions directed at these wider contexts of unsafe behaviour merit greater attention. Such approaches have the added benefit of being less susceptible to 'risk compensation' which has the potential to undermine strategies directed at reducing the transmission efficiency of HIV.     

Statistical consulting

The paper and the special issue focus on the activity of statistical consulting and its varieties. This includes academic consulting, consulting to and in industry as well as statistics in public media.     

Some results on optimality in models with heteroscedastic errors from partial optimum designs

This paper studies optimum designs for linear models when the errors are heteroscedastic. Sufficient conditions are given in order to obtainD-, A- andE-optimum designs for a complete regression model from partial optimum designs for some sub-parameters. A result about optimality for a complete model from the optimality for the submodels is included. Supported by Junta de Andalucía, research group FQM244.     

A “brer rabbit” case for reverse mandated benefits

Reverse mandated benefits is a government-mandated policy that requires employees to provide their employers with benefits that workers would not provide otherwise. Of course, only those benefits would be mandated that are worth more to employers than they cost, as determined by political authorities. My case for such a policy argues that it is at least as sensible as policies mandating that employers provide benefits to their employees that would not be provided otherwise.