Translators, traitors, and traducers: Perjuring Hawaiian same-sex texts through deliberate mistranslation

In the long history of the West's encounter with Hawaiian culture, which began in the late 1700s with Captain Cook, translators and translations have often been the tools of intentional falsehood, thus demonstrating the truth of the Italian proverb, Traduttore, traditore ("the translator is a traitor")--particularly with regard to same-sex texts. The standards of truth have often been subverted in translation by the demands of foreign religion, hegemony, business, and academe. This subversion continues to this day in the form of the "missionary mentality" in politics and law. The way out of this situation is a brutally honest cleaning-off of the besmirched Hawaiian texts.     

The Individually Responsible and Rational Decision Approach to Economic Lot Sizes for One Vendor and Many Purchasers: A Comment*

Joglekar and Tharthare [6] presented an alternate approach for minimizing total inventory carrying and ordering costs of a vendor and the purchaser(s). This approach permits the vendor and the purchaser(s) to rationally select their operating policies. Joglekar and Tharthare claimed that their approach is more economical than the joint lot-size approach. In this note we identify some conceptual issues in their approach and demonstrate the superiority of the joint lot-size approach with the help of an example.     

Auditors' Assessment of Management's Disposition: An Attributional Analysis*

Auditors' assessment of management's dispositions presumably affects their subsequent judgments. However, little is known about the process by which auditors infer characteristics of management. This paper proposes the theory of correspondent inferences [25] as a framework for examining auditors' assessment of management's dispositions; the model is tested in a laboratory experiment using experienced audit managers. The results are consistent with the proposed theoretical framework. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Stochastic and Intransitive Behavior in a State-Preference Model of Asset Choice*

Most models of investor behavior assume a time-state independent utility function and result in a deterministic solution where a given set of inputs uniquely specifies the decision. In contrast, a state preference model using a time-state dependent utility function is derived in this paper. The model allows the investment choice decision to be analyzed in a game theoretic context. The general solution is a mixed strategy which allows for a probabilistic interpretation of the decision. The approach presented in this paper can accommodate anomalies such as intransitivity of preference and satisficing as rational behavior. An example of a possible implementation is given along with interpretations of the outcomes.