MARKET POWER AND COLLUSION IN THE OCEAN SHIPPING INDUSTRY: IS A BIGGER CARTEL A BETTER CARTEL?

The regulatory structure of the ocean shipping industry allows carriers to enter into joint pricing agreements (conference agreements) that are free from antitrust scrutiny, and requires freight rates to be published and policed by a government agency. We test whether this regulatory structure leads to the exercise of market power, and identify whether that market power resides with conferences themselves or requires the participation of carriers outside the conference. The results suggest that liner conferences are not particularly effective cartels although some market power may exist in ocean shipping. Market concentration may be a contributing factor to this market power. (JEL L12, L43, L92, K21)     

Working with Sex Offenders: A Social Skills Training Group

Summary The paper presents an account of a group of sex offenders ina local prison. Nine sessions of social skills training weregiven with the aim of facilitating relationships within theprison and possibly after release.     

STOCK RETURNS, INFLATION, AND REAL OUTPUT

This paper provides empirical evidence on the extent to which the inverse relationship between real stock returns and inflation in recent years is causal or spurious. The results indicate that this relationship is spurious and can be explained by the inverse correlation between unexpected inflation and unexpected real output. The expected and unexpected real output and inflation variables are generated from the ASA/NBER Business Outlook Surveys.     

THE COMMON POOL, BARGAINING, AND THE RULE OF CAPTURE

Firms producing from a single oilfield face the common-pool problem: how to divide production and profits among themselves. The rule of capture creates competition among them to produce the oil before anyone else does, and a tendency for overproduction. Private bargaining among the firms can avoid the wasteful production practices associated with the rule of capture and increase joint profits. This paper explores the structure and expected outcome of the common-pool problem, and demonstrates that smaller producers hold a bargaining advantage that is not easily overcome by larger producers or neutral arbitrators.     

PRODUCTION COSTS, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR CHOICE

Local governments that choose to externally produce a service can contract with other governments, for-profit firms, or nonprofit organizations. This contractor choice is modeled as one in which the local government decision maker minimizes service delivery costs, both production and transaction costs, subject to political and fiscal constraints. The model is estimated using data on three frequently contracted health services obtained from a national survey of local government service delivery arrangements. The empirical analysis reveals the importance of both production and transaction costs, as well as the choice set of available suppliers, to contractor choice.