An exchange heuristic for resource constrained scheduling with consideration given to opportunities for parallel processing

This paper describes a heuristic which produces efficient makespans for resource-constrained scheduling problems with parallel processing capabilities. This heuristic was initially developed for the scheduling of army battalion training exercises. The original heuristic has also been successfully applied to solve problems in project scheduling with limited resources, generalized job shop scheduling, and resource-constrained scheduling. The exchange heuristic requires an initial feasible solution upon which it improves the makespan by efficiently and systematically shuffling activities while maintaining feasibility. The method has recently been modified twice, termed the intelligent version and naive version, respectively, such that its ability to reduce the initial makespan is enhanced. In this study     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION

Two questions are addressed in this paper. (A) Why do labor unions and certain employer organizations respectively promote and impede minimum wage legislation? (B) Do these groups have significant impacts on minimum wages? Question (A) is examined in the context of models that identify the economic self-interest of unionized skilled workers and capitalists in legal wage floors. Question (B) is approached by a median legislator utility maximization model that leads to Tobit estimation of the relationship between state minimum wage rates and measures of statewide organized labor and capital and average hourly earnings.     

A Study of Class Consciousness*

A partir d'un échantillon aléatoire de la population de London, Ontario, nous examinons l'étendue de la conscience de classe et la relation de cet état d'esprit avec les variables religion, ethnicité et classe sociale. Le degré de conscience de classe ouvrière observe est plus prononcé qu'on le dit habituellement dans le cas du Canada. Des analyses à deux et à plusieurs variables révèlent que la classe sociale a un effet plus prononcé sur la conscience de classe que la religion et I'ethnicité. Les travailleurs manuels sont beaucoup plus portés que les employés non-manuels à exprimer des attitudes sociopolitiques révélant une conscience de classe ouvrière; c'est au niveau des cadres de grandes entreprises que l'on rencontre le plus la conscience l'appartenir à la classe moyenne. Among a randomly drawn sample of London, Ontario, residents we examined the prevalence of class consciousness and the relationship of this state of mind to religious, ethnic, and class variables. The degree of working-class consciousness expressed by the sample was greater than that usually alleged to exist in Canada. Bivariate and multivariate analyses revealed that social class had a far stronger impact on class consciousness than had religious and ethnic factors. Manual workers to a far greater extent than non-manual employees expressed sociopolitical attitudes indicative of working-class consciousness; the greatest amount of middle-class consciousness was found among upper-echelon personnel of large organizations.     

FURTHER RESULTS ON EQUILIBRIUM PATTERNS OF COMPETITION IN OCS LEASE SALES

A prior model of competitive bidding for offshore petroleum leases is subjected to more extensive empirical testing based on underlying geological data prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey. The current results strongly reinforce the tentative conclusions advanced in the previous paper, and demonstrate the robustness of the model. In light of the current results, it seems very likely that participants in offshore lease sales behave as if their operations were constrained physically such that only a limited volume of petroleum reserves are pursued in any one sale.     

ECONOMIC WELFARE, PRICE AND PROFIT: THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST REGIMES

This paper critically examines the deterrent effect of price-fixing statutes under alternative antitrust regimes. A regime is defined by the litigation strategy which the antitrust agency employs in detecting cartels and in determining whether prosecution is warranted and by the basis upon which courts estimate damages. The results of the analysis suggest that antitrust policy may actually induce cartels to further restrict output, increasing welfare loss above the level imposed by an unthreatened, perfect monopoly. Litigation strategy and damages should be founded upon consideration of welfare loss measures to avoid this possibility.     

ANTICIPATED MONEY, UNANTICIPATED MONEY, AND OUTPUT: 1873–1930

Unanticipated money does, and anticipated money does not, influence output for the period between the Civil War and the Depression. These conclusions, reached using a two-step econometric procedure, appear robust for a wide variety of measures of output and for two alternate definitions of money.     

TAKEOVERS: MANAGERIAL INCOMPETENCE OR MANAGERIAL SHIRKING?

Agency theory identifies managerial shirking as the cause for takeovers, while other explanations focus on low ability managers. This paper formalizes Jensen's free cash flow variant of agency theory by constructing a simple two-period game which captures the distinctive empirical implications of the two theories.
Using data for petroleum firms following the oil price shock of 1979-80, we find that firms undergoing financial restructuring exhibited higher values of Tobin's q. Additionally, evidence of management turnover and workforce cuts emphasizes that takeovers appear primarily designed to address agency concerns.