Normal Mixture Quasi-maximum Likelihood Estimator for GARCH Models

Abstract.  The generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) model has been popular in the analysis of financial time series data with high volatility. Conventionally, the parameter estimation in GARCH models has been performed based on the Gaussian quasi-maximum likelihood. However, when the innovation terms have either heavy-tailed or skewed distributions, the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) does not function well. In order to remedy this defect, we propose the normal mixture QMLE (NM-QMLE), which is obtained from the normal mixture quasi-likelihood, and demonstrate that the NM-QMLE is consistent and asymptotically normal. Finally, we present simulation results and a real data analysis in order to illustrate our findings.     

The impact of critical success factors of JIT implementation on organizational performance

Much has been written and publicized about the virtues of JIT philosophies during the past decade. However, relatively limited empirical research has been reported con-cerningJIT implementation on organizational performance. This study presents the results of an empirical study which utilized both concrete financial accounting data and a broad cross-sectional survey as measures of organizational performance to determine the impact of each JIT implementation requirement factor to organizational performance. Communication between production and marketing departments was identified as a critical factor for increased inventory turnover and work-in-process inventory turnover, while employees' participation and the bottom-up management approach were determined as significant factors for improving quality and flexibility. The results of this study imply that in JTT environment personnel management practices, such as bottom-up management encouraging employees participation, and organization management such as a communications linking the production and marketing departments, are more important than JIT practices themselves.     

Decoding the Signal Effects of Job Candidate Attraction to Corporate Social Practices

This article seeks to go beyond the implied assumption from previous research that job candidate attraction to corporate social practices is equivalent across individuals. To this end, we propose a framework for categorizing individuals' attraction to different corporate social performance profiles. Our framework is grounded in relational models theory and Mitroff's model of managers' “ideal organizations.” An inductive approach was used to elaborate upon the model and assess the extent to which candidates preferences vary. Data were collected from prospective job seekers regarding their attraction to social practices that benefit or harm various stakeholders, and these responses were used to develop profiles of job candidates' attraction to distinct profiles of organizations' social practices. The results provide a guide for managers who wish to improve the likelihood that an organization's social practices reflect what is best about its culture.     

Human resource management in the just-in-time environment

Successful just-in-time (JIT) implementation requires a multiskilled group-oriented and self-disciplined workforce with good quantitative skills. Little discussion exists in the JIT literature concerning the development of such a workforce. The human resource management (HRM) literature deals with employee issues but does not identify strategies for achieving a JIT workforce. In order to identify appropriate HRM strategies for a JIT environment, a comprehensive model is presented to show the critical linkage between JIT and HRM. Interactions between legal issues, management and union, and human input are examined. The impact of US labour laws on HRM practices is discussed and contrasted with Japanese practices. The literature review of HRM-related JIT articles suggests that HRM practices in the areas of staffing, training and development, compensation, and employee retention can be used to develop an effective JIT workforce. The article will help production managers to understand the impact of specific HRM strategies that are appropriate for developing a JIT workforce.     

To Cut and Control: Institutional Preservation and the Sterilization of Mentally Retarded People in the United States, 1892–1947

Abstract Between 1892 and 1947, American institutional superintendents argued three distinct, though overlapping, cases for sterilizing mentally retarded people: sterilization to maintain institutional order, sterilization for eugenic control, and sterilization for controlling the growth of institutional populations. Departing from recent critics who see sterilization as a debate between 'segregation or sterilization' and who link this debate principally to the eugenics movement, I argue that superintendents drew on the above rationales to preserve their institutions in the face of several external factors, not merely eugenics. As such, sterilization became a 'medical' procedure constructed not so much for its explicit purpose - stopping procreation, but to maintain institutional stability and preserve professional prerogative.     

DIRECT TESTS OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES FOR EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY

Departures from “economic man” behavior in many games in which fairness is a salient characteristic are now well documented in the experimental economics literature. These data have inspired the development of models of social preferences that assume agents have preferences for equity and efficiency as well as their own material payoffs. Empirical failure of the economic man model comes from experiments that provide direct tests of its distinguishing characteristic: indifference to the payoffs of others. This paper reports an experiment that subjects popular social preferences models to the same type of empirical challenge. We report direct tests of the distinguishing characteristics of these models: preference for allocations that have higher efficiency and greater equity. (JEL A12, A13, B49, C70, C91, D63)     

DO RENT‐SEEKING GROUPS ANNOUNCE THEIR SHARING RULES?

We study collective rent seeking between two groups in which each group has the option of releasing or not its sharing‐rule information. First, we show that the case where both groups release their sharing‐rule information never occurs in equilibrium; when the players are unevenly matched, one group releases its sharing‐rule information and the other does not. Then, we select the Pareto‐superior equilibrium when the players are unevenly matched. We show that, in this selected equilibrium, the underdog releases its sharing‐rule information, and the favorite does not; thus, the underdog becomes the leader, and the favorite the follower (JEL D72).