Explaining Information System Use with System-Monitored vs. Self-Reported Use Measures

New information technologies promise to generate new kinds ofdata. In this study, system-monitored use of a business-orientedvideotex service is compared to self-reported use of the service.Results show that interest in the information provided by theservice was the strongest correlate of the self-reports, whileage and income were the strongest correlates of system-monitoreduse.     

THE EFFECT OF MONETARY INCENTIVES AND FOLLOW-UP MAILINGS ON THE RESPONSE RATE AND RESPONSE QUALITY IN MAIL SURVEYS

The joint and comparative effects of the use of monetary incentivesand follow-up mailings were examined in a mail survey of suburbanWashington, DC cable television subscribers. Four experimentalgroups received monetary incentives enclosed with the firstmailing only ($0.25, $0.50, $1.00, or $2.00) and three follow-upmailings. These groups were compared with each other and againsta control group that did not receive an incentive. The resultsindicated that the response rate from the first mailing increasedsignificantly as the incentive amount increased from zero to$0.25, and from $0.25 to $1.00. Four mailings without an incentiveproduced a higher response rate than a single mailing with anincentive, but a combination of follow-up mailings and a $1.00or $2.00 incentive produced a significantly higher responserate than an equivalent number of mailings without an incentive. There was some evidence of intertreatment response bias. Largermonetary incentives tended to produce: (1) a greater degreeof effort expended in completing the questionnaires, as measuredby the number of short answers and comments provided, and thenumber of words written, and (2) comments that were more favorabletoward the survey sponsor.     

WORKERS SHOULD WANT TO PAY MORE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY

One controversial aspect of the current Social Security system has been the relative distribution of its net costs and benefits between employers and workers. Using simple supply and demand analysis, we demonstrate that proponents and opponents of the current system are making arguments that support the position of their adversaries. In particular, proponents of the existing Social Security system should be arguing that workers pay all of the Social Security tax and then some with lower wages, while opponents should be arguing that employers are paying most of the tax. (JEL H55 , D78 )     

IN SEARCH OF THE WINNER'S CURSE

Earlier papers on the winner's curse have provided theoretical arguments that winning bidders in an auction will incur ex post losses even when all bidders use reasonable ex ante bidding strategies. This paper demonstrates that these arguments are erroneous: optimal ex ante bidders will never suffer from a winner's curse in an auction where only the winning bid is announced; furthermore, such bidders will on the average not suffer from a winner's curse in an auction where all bids are announced. Thus if a winner's curse is a behavioral reality then bidders are not generally using ex ante optimal strategies.