Putting schools as socio/economic institutions back into educational evaluation: A response to Kean and McNamara

A number of individuals have proposed the gradual refinement of existing programs, rather than their continual closing down, as a safeguard against educational fads and political pressures. The gradual refinement thesis is extended, refined, and criticized in this article. A different unit of analysis is proposed, one which takes into account the role of educational institutions in assisting in the reproduction of both cultural and economic inequality. It is argued that decisions about the gradual refinement of programs and institutions are not only technical but ideological and politico/economic in nature. Criteria for deciding on gradual refinement, based on a strategy of nonreformist reforms, are suggested.     

AN APPROXIMATE MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATOR FOR CHAIN BINOMIAL MODELS

Using the Poisson approximation to the Binomial distribution, we construct an approximate maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for a class of chain binomial models. Our estimator proves to have properties which may make it preferable to the exact WLE.     

SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS IN RAWLSIAN CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT ON DISTRIBUTIONAL RULES

Rawls (1971) argued that individuals choosing institutions from behind the veil of ignorance would unanimously agree on institutions that maximized the imputations of the least advantaged persons in the post-choice social outcome. Critics have argued that the Rawlsian contract requires risk averse individuals. Our paper focuses on the contractual element inherent in constitutional choice when individuals have differing subjective estimates of the working properties of different institutions. We show that in genuinely Rawlsian contractual settings there may exist a general bias toward the selection of institutions that embody maximin solutions without the assumption of risk aversion.     

On aliasing and generalized defining relationships of factorial arrangements

The concepts of defining contrast (DC), generalized defining relationship (GDR) and aliasing structure (AS) are now well established in the terminology of regression analysis and factorial design theory. There is no complete agreement in the literature about the meaning of regular and irregular fractional factorial designs. This paper provides a workable definition of a regular fraction from a symmetrial prime-powered factorial. It characterizes the uniqueness of the GDR for fractions from the most general factorial. Results are also présentés on the uniqueness of the GDR for regular designs, on orthogonality aspects of regular and irregular designs, and on group-theoretic generation of the complete aliasing structure. Examples are provided to illustrate the developments.     

THE EFFECT OF SAMPLE STRUCTURE ON ANALYTICAL SURVEYS1,2

The core of this paper is a dialogue between "Harry", an experienced survey statistician and "Fred", a young mathematical statistician. They have contrasting approaches to the problem of estimating a regression relationship from a stratified sample, but after one or two red herrings are dragged out, both realize that the situation is not as simple as they had supposed. The role played by the probabilities of selection is a central issue. Estimation sampling for means, totals, and ratios is also considered, and seen to be a special case of the general analytical sampling synthesis they had already agreed upon.     

An economic analysis of public sector collective bargaining and strike activity

This paper develops a theory of public sector collective bargaining and uses it to investigate the economic determinants of public sector strike activity. The model considers union leaders, union members, bureaucrats, politicians, and voters, with the intention of explicitly recognizing both the constraints placed on the bargaining parties by their constituents and the differences between public and private sector collective bargaining. The empirical results indicate that only in cases where both negotiating parties are motivated by self-interest can we expect frequent strikes and strikes of long duration. The results also suggest that public sector strikes are countercyclical and principally influenced by the business cycle and its impact on state and local revenues.