The Poll as a News Event in the 1980 Presidential Campaign

Public opinion polls made up 15 percent of the news events coveredduring the 1980 presidential election campaign, but news storiesgenerated by polls were no more likely to receive better playin the 50 newspapers studied than other stories about the campaign.Horserace polls were popular with editors during the last twoweeks of the campaign.     

CYBERNETICS AND MACROECONOMICS

A full estimate of the effects of cybernetics and control systems engineering on economics would be premature if not impossible at this time. The relevant literature is at most twenty-five years old and its ultimate impact remains uncertain; thus conclusions are at best tentative. However, one can identify sources of inspiration and main participants as well as apparent trends. Axel Leijonhufvud has referred to the introduction of control engineering into aggregate analysis by Tustin, Phillips, and others in the 1950s as “the Keynesian Revolution which did not come off.” One purpose of this paper is to explore Leijonhufvud's observation. What stopped monetary and macroeconomic theorists from picking up the Tustin-Phillips lead and making the control-theoretic approach an integral part of economic analysis? Historians of economics writing a few decades from now may be able to provide a proper answer. But a few speculations can be offered now.     

BIDDING TILL BANKRUPT DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS

The analysis and evidence here suggest that the market for star athletes in professional sports could be subject to "destructive competition"—a competitive process which drives some participants from a market even though it is inefficient for them to leave. When pursuing a league championship, the talent which turns an average team into a contender contributes disproportionately to the team's success. Teams which fail to earn enough on the last stars they sign to offset losses on their inframarginal talent will abandon a competitive market for star athletes. Other situations that involve input rivalry between producers might yield similar results.     

Explaining Information System Use with System-Monitored vs. Self-Reported Use Measures

New information technologies promise to generate new kinds ofdata. In this study, system-monitored use of a business-orientedvideotex service is compared to self-reported use of the service.Results show that interest in the information provided by theservice was the strongest correlate of the self-reports, whileage and income were the strongest correlates of system-monitoreduse.     

THE EFFECT OF MONETARY INCENTIVES AND FOLLOW-UP MAILINGS ON THE RESPONSE RATE AND RESPONSE QUALITY IN MAIL SURVEYS

The joint and comparative effects of the use of monetary incentivesand follow-up mailings were examined in a mail survey of suburbanWashington, DC cable television subscribers. Four experimentalgroups received monetary incentives enclosed with the firstmailing only ($0.25, $0.50, $1.00, or $2.00) and three follow-upmailings. These groups were compared with each other and againsta control group that did not receive an incentive. The resultsindicated that the response rate from the first mailing increasedsignificantly as the incentive amount increased from zero to$0.25, and from $0.25 to $1.00. Four mailings without an incentiveproduced a higher response rate than a single mailing with anincentive, but a combination of follow-up mailings and a $1.00or $2.00 incentive produced a significantly higher responserate than an equivalent number of mailings without an incentive. There was some evidence of intertreatment response bias. Largermonetary incentives tended to produce: (1) a greater degreeof effort expended in completing the questionnaires, as measuredby the number of short answers and comments provided, and thenumber of words written, and (2) comments that were more favorabletoward the survey sponsor.     

IN SEARCH OF THE WINNER'S CURSE

Earlier papers on the winner's curse have provided theoretical arguments that winning bidders in an auction will incur ex post losses even when all bidders use reasonable ex ante bidding strategies. This paper demonstrates that these arguments are erroneous: optimal ex ante bidders will never suffer from a winner's curse in an auction where only the winning bid is announced; furthermore, such bidders will on the average not suffer from a winner's curse in an auction where all bids are announced. Thus if a winner's curse is a behavioral reality then bidders are not generally using ex ante optimal strategies.