STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUTUAL FUND REVOLUTION

We find that higher stock ownership rates are linked to an upward shift in the Republican share of the House popular vote since the late 1980s, consistent with theories that property interests affect voting. To proxy for discontinuous stock ownership rates, we use equity mutual fund costs, which have fallen, are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates and the Republican vote share in the long run, and help explain short‐run changes along with midterm elections, economic conditions, and presidential popularity. Findings suggest that the major parties’ shares of the House popular vote will fluctuate around 50% until other factors trigger a political realignment. (JEL D72, G11)     

Institutionalization and disengagement among the elderly*

Lanalyse qui suit présente les résultats d'une étude empirique comparant les relations sociales parmi les gens âgés demeurant au sein de la communautéà celles qui prévalent dans les foyers pour vieillards, et ce à partir d'un échantillon aléatoire de la population d‘àge avancé du Manitoba pour l'année 1971. Les résultats indiquent que ces vieillards, tout comme les résidents des “ghettos gris,” ont des niveaux d'interaction sociale plus élevés et plus satisfaisants que les vieillards qui demeurent au sein méLme de la communauté. De telles observations nous semblent importantes non seulement du point de vue de notre compréhension des “institutions totales,” mais aussi par rapport aux problèmes plus généraux du vieillissement et du “désengagement.” Le fait que la participation aux événements interactionels soit plus élevée parmi les résidents de ces foyers (et des autres “ghettos gris”) correspond à cette théorie du vieillissement qui voit le “désengagement” chez les vieillards comme une réponse spécifique à la position qu'ils occupent au sein de la structure de stratification d’âges du capitalisme avancé. This paper presents the results of an empirical analysis of the relationship between institutionalization and disengagement based on a random stratified sample of the elderly population of Manitoba in 1971. The results indicate that the institutionalized elderly, like other residents of “grey ghettos,” have higher levels of social interaction and derive greater satisfaction from their social relations than do the elderly residing in the larger community. It is suggested that these findings are not only significant for our understanding of the nature of “total institutions” but are also suggestive with respect to the more general issue of disengagement and aging. The fact that involvement in interactional events is greater among the institutionalized elderly (and other residents of “grey ghettos”) is consistent with a theory of aging which views disengagement among the elderly as a response which is historically specific to the position which they occupy within the structure of age stratification characteristic of advanced capitalism.     

MANAGERIAL MOTIVES, MARKET STRUCTURES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF HOLDING COMPANY BANKS

Since the late 1960's bank holding companies have become a dominant force in U. S. banking; they now account for over 2/3 of the nation's total deposits. This paper tests the hypothesis that the holding company form of organization leads to relatively risk-taking behavior by affiliated banks. A major finding is that holding company banks react to monopolistic market situations by choosing risker portfolios and by leveraging to a greater extent than their independent counterparts. Such a behavioral characteristic has important implications for the allocation of resources in the country's 2600 local banking markets and for the regulation of financial institutions in general.