In Search of House Effects: A Comparison of Responses to Various Questions byfferent Survey OrganizationsTOM

This paper examines the responses to various questions askedby different survey organizations. It considers the questionof whether different survey organizations produce similar measurementsof public opinion or whether house effects produce dissimilarmeasurements of the same population.     

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In each issue, THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY publishes a continuationof an annotated bibliography which appeared in 1935 in bookform (Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith,Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography.Minneapolis: Published for the Social Science Research Councilby University of Minnesota Press, 1935. 450 pp.).     

PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION

The political views of citizens should be reflected in the governmentof a democratic society. Typically, citizens' views are expressedby their elected representatives. We used the Center for PoliticalStudies (CPS) 1986 National Election Study and a mail surveyof the U.S. House of Representatives to look at representationcollectively and dyadically. Collectively, we find some degreeof congruence between leaders and followers. However, thereare significant differences between them on half of the issueitems, with the leaders usually taking more extreme positionsthan the followers. We looked at leaders and followers dyadicallyin 33 districts using Achen's measures of representation. Wefound that the representatives' views are fairly close to thoseof their constituents, that representatives are efficient atpositioning themselves at the mean constituent position, andthat representatives respond to shifts in liberalism/ conservatismin their districts.     

REWARDS, EXPERIENCE AND DECISION COSTS IN FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS

Consistent with a model of asymmetric risk aversion, subjects in first price auctions consistently bid above the risk neutral Nash prediction. It has been argued that this is due to low opportunity cost of deviating from the risk neutral bid. We increase opportunity cost (and payoff levels) by factors of 0, 1, 5, 10, and 20, from the normal levels generating payoffs up to $250 for risk neutral subjects and observe an insignificant increase in the slope of individual bid functions. The RMSE of bids declines significantly. This is consistent with a reward/decision cost model of bidding behavior.     

THE LAW OF DEMAND, POSITIVE SLOPING MARGINAL REVENUE, AND MULTIPLE PROFIT EQUILIBRIA

This paper demonstrates that the conditions for a positively sloping marginal revenue curve are much less stringent than is generally recognized. Simple transformations of any well-behaved convex demand function can easily result in a demand for which marginal revenue is positively sloping. For this reason, positively sloping marginal revenue functions must be considered whenever convex demand functions are analyzed. The existence of positively sloping marginal revenue makes multiple profit equilibria for the firm a very real possibility.     

NON-AGGRESSIVE BIDDING BEHAVIOR AND THE "WINNER'S CURSE"

Previous authors have noted a curious result that arises within the context of sealed-bid auctions: in certain situations it is in the bidder's interest to respond non-aggressively to increased competition. We consider a decision-theoretic formulation of the bidder's problem, and derive necessary conditions for the choice of a non-aggressive bidding strategy. The resulting conditions relate closely to a phenomenon that has been described rather loosely by bidding practitioners as the "winner's curse.' In the course of this paper we develop a specific definition of the winner's curse, and demonstrate how it affects the firm's competitive behavior.