International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

Statistical consulting

The paper and the special issue focus on the activity of statistical consulting and its varieties. This includes academic consulting, consulting to and in industry as well as statistics in public media.     

Optimal scaling of Metropolis algorithms: Heading toward general target distributions

The authors provide an overview of optimal scaling results for the Metropolis algorithm with Gaussian proposal distribution. They address in more depth the case of high‐dimensional target distributions formed of independent, but not identically distributed components. They attempt to give an intuitive explanation as to why the well‐known optimal acceptance rate of 0.234 is not always suitable. They show how to find the asymptotically optimal acceptance rate when needed, and they explain why it is sometimes necessary to turn to inhomogeneous proposal distributions. Their results are illustrated with a simple example.     

Some results on optimality in models with heteroscedastic errors from partial optimum designs

This paper studies optimum designs for linear models when the errors are heteroscedastic. Sufficient conditions are given in order to obtainD-, A- andE-optimum designs for a complete regression model from partial optimum designs for some sub-parameters. A result about optimality for a complete model from the optimality for the submodels is included. Supported by Junta de Andalucía, research group FQM244.     

A “brer rabbit” case for reverse mandated benefits

Reverse mandated benefits is a government-mandated policy that requires employees to provide their employers with benefits that workers would not provide otherwise. Of course, only those benefits would be mandated that are worth more to employers than they cost, as determined by political authorities. My case for such a policy argues that it is at least as sensible as policies mandating that employers provide benefits to their employees that would not be provided otherwise.     

Intertemporal choice under timing risk: An experimental approach

This paper investigates how individuals evaluate delayed outcomes with risky realization times. Under the discounted expected utility (DEU) model, such evaluations depend only on intertemporal preferences. We obtain several testable hypotheses using the DEU model as a benchmark and test these hypotheses in three experiments. In general, our results show that the DEU model is a poor predictor of intertemporal choice behavior under timing risk. We found that individuals are averse to timing risk and that they evaluate timing lotteries in a rank-dependent fashion. The main driver of timing risk aversion is nothing but probabilistic risk aversion that stems from the nonlinear treatment of probabilities.