(Un)Verst?ndlichkeit des Steuerrechts und Nachfrage nach Steuerberatungsdienstleistungen: Ein Experiment

Although increasing the understandability of tax law is a popular postulation, the consequences for individual decisions and the distribution of the tax burdens are far from clear. For this reason, the effects on the demand for tax advice are analyzed in an experimental setting: the participants had to rank pension plans while the understandability of the tax system was modified. We show that an increasing understandability of tax law significantly decreases the willingness to pay for tax advice and that this relationship is moderated by the individuals?? level of education. In fact, in our experiment only individuals with a high education level benefit from the improved understandability of tax law.     

Supply Chain Contract Design: Impact of Bounded Rationality and Individual Heterogeneity

In this article, we model various forms of non‐optimizing behavior in a newsvendor setting, including biases such as recency, reinforcement, demand chasing, and anchoring, as well as unsystematic decision errors. We assume that a newsvendor may evaluate decisions by examining both past outcomes and future expected payoffs. Our model is motivated by laboratory observations under several types of supply chain contracts. Ordering decisions are found to follow multi‐modal distributions that are dependent on contract structures and incentives. We differ from previous research by using statistics to determine which behavioral factors are applicable to each decision maker. A great deal of heterogeneity was discovered, indicating the importance of calibrating a contract to the individual. Our analysis also shows that the profit performance and the effectiveness of co‐ordinating contracts can be affected by non‐optimizing behaviors significantly. We conclude that, in addition to the aggregate order quantities, the decision distributions should be considered in designing contracts.     

Research with children: sharing the dilemmas

This paper identifies a number of significant gaps between the principles of good practice in research with children and the practical realities of conducting a research project with children. The context of the discussion is an ongoing research study of children and young people in Scotland with a parent or carer with HIV. The paper argues that conducting research with what is a hidden (and in many ways secret) population throws into sharp relief some difficulties and contradictions that are at the heart of the research process. The paper does not intend to present easy answers to the complex questions that it raises: the research project it describes is ongoing and not yet at the stage of disseminating findings in any definitive way. Moreover, it seems likely that there are no answers to the questions raised, but that the act of posing the questions may contribute to the development of better, more reflexive research with children.     

Complexity as a Contract Design Factor: A Human‐to‐Human Experimental Study

Despite being theoretically suboptimal, simpler contracts (such as price‐only contracts and quantity discount contracts with limited number of price blocks) are commonly preferred in practice. Thus, exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. Using human subject experiments, Kalkancı et al. (2011) showed that such simpler contracts perform effectively for a supplier interacting with a computerized buyer under asymmetric demand information. We use a similar set of experiments with the modification that a human supplier interacts with a human buyer. We show that human interactions strengthen the supplier's preference for simpler contracts. We find that suppliers have fairness concerns even when they interact with computerized buyers. These fairness concerns tend to be even stronger when suppliers interact with human buyers, particularly when the complexity of the contract is low. We also find that suppliers are more prone to random decision errors (i.e., bounded rationality) when interacting with human buyers. In the absence of social preferences, Kalkancı et al. identified reinforcement and bounded rationality as key biases that impact suppliers' decisions. In human‐to‐human experiments, we find evidence for social preference effects. However, these effects may be secondary to bounded rationality.