Your Place or Mine? On the Residence Choice of Young Couples in Norway

Norwegian registry data are used to investigate the location decisions of a full population cohort of young adults as they complete their education, establish separate households, and form their own families. We find that the labor market opportunities and family ties of both partners affect these location choices. Surprisingly, married men live significantly closer to their own parents than do married women, even if they have children, and this difference cannot be explained by differences in observed characteristics. The principal source of excess female distance from parents in this population is the relatively low mobility of men without a college degree, particularly in rural areas. Despite evidence that intergenerational resource flows, such as childcare and eldercare, are particularly important between women and their parents, the family connections of husbands appear to dominate the location decisions of less-educated married couples.     

When Cooperation is the Norm of Appropriateness: How Does CEO Cooperative Behaviour Affect Organizational Performance?

The current study has tested the prediction that CEO cooperative behaviour has an impact upon organizational performance. This is a fundamental organizational issue that is in clear need of illumination through studies of practice. We pursued the issue through a study of leadership in organizations located in the Norwegian socio‐cultural context in which cooperation has been, and still is, a norm of appropriateness. The study provided empirical evidence of a positive relationship between CEO cooperative behaviour and organizational performance. This relationship appeared to be stronger in organizational contexts in which CEOs are perceived to have legitimacy and managerial discretion, and it appeared to be weaker in organizations in which individual performance pay is the rule. Since some organizational characteristics have the potential to enhance the impact of CEO cooperative behaviour while other characteristics might inhibit this impact, leaders have to consider carefully how to develop and maintain individual and organizational capabilities that are needed to act appropriately.     

Intergenerational earnings mobility and divorce

This paper examines the potential effect of marital disruption on intergenerational earnings mobility. We observe the earnings of children born in 1960 and 1970 along with their biological fathers and mothers. The earnings mobility between sons and daughters relative to the earnings of their mothers and fathers is estimated. Our results suggest that divorce is associated with increased mobility, except between mothers’ and daughters’ earnings. Transition matrices reveal that the direction of the mobility is negative; children of divorced parents tend to move downward in the earnings distribution compared to children from intact families. Finally, we utilize information on the earnings mobility of siblings in dissolved families who grew up when the family was intact. The difference between pre- and post-divorce siblings is in turn compared with sibling differences in intact families.     

Stubbornness,Power, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Multiple Equilibria

Axelord’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 games with two pure strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase in conflict. This article takes the opposite view, arguing that if losing becomes less costly, a player is less likely to gamble to win, which means that conflict will be less frequent. This approach leads to a new power index and a new measure of stubbornness, both anchored in strategic reasoning. The win probability defined as power constitutes an equilibrium refinement which differs from Harsanyi and Selten’s [(1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge] refinement. In contrast, Axelrod’s approach focuses on preferences regarding divergences from imaginary outmost rewards that cannot be obtained jointly. The player who is less powerful in an asymmetric one-shot game becomes more powerful in the repeated game, provided he or she values the future sufficiently more than the opponent. This contrasts with the view that repetition induces cooperation, but conforms with the expectation that a more patient player receives a larger share of the pie.      

HOW DESTRUCTIVE IS CREATIVE DESTRUCTION? EFFECTS OF JOB LOSS ON JOB MOBILITY,WITHDRAWAL AND INCOME

We analyze short and long‐term effects of worker displacement. Our sample consists of male workers displaced from Norwegian manufacturing plants. We find that displacement increases the probability of leaving the labor force by 31%. The drop‐out rate from the labor force is particularly high in the first years following displacement. The average earnings effects for those who remain in the labor force are moderate, a 3% loss relative to non‐displaced workers after seven years. Splitting displaced workers on within‐ and between‐firm movers, we find that the estimated earnings loss is entirely driven by between‐firm movers who experience a 3.6% loss. Transfers to other plants within multi‐plant firms upon displacement are quite common. Our results support the view that human capital is partly firm specific and partly industry specific. We find no evidence suggesting that human capital is plant specific.