Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces

We consider the problem of choosing the location of a public facility either (a) on a tree network or (b) in a Euclidean space. (a) (1996) characterize the class of target rules on a tree network by Pareto efficiency and population-monotonicity. Using Vohra's (1999) characterization of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and replacement-domination, we give a short proof of the previous characterization and show that it also holds on the domain of symmetric preferences. (b) The result obtained for model (a) proves to be crucial for the analysis of the problem of choosing the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. Our main result is the characterization of the class of coordinatewise target rules by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and either replacement-domination or population-monotonicity.     

Participation in Decision-making at the Plant Level: Reflections on the German Experience

Plant level participation because of its location offers larger opportunities to influence decisions than participation on the job but falls short of providing access to company decision arenas. Legal institutional regulations become important because of the specific characteristics of this kind of involvement in decision-making of dependent labor. Therefore the German Framework is described and discussed with democratic conceptual, social science and new institutional economics perspectives in mind. The findings show the restrictions of plant level participation but—at least for the German case—indicate that differences in interest tend to be expressed and modify decisions. An evaluation of effects on business activities nevertheless does not indicate systematic disadvantageous economic consequences, there might even be positive results in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.     

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (J Econ Theory 21: 75–106, 2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market, there always exists a “double stable” matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets, the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.     

Rational choice and revealed preference without binariness

 This paper attempts to provide a unified account of the rationalization of possibly non-binary choice-functions by “Extended Preference Relations” (relations between sets and elements). The analysis focuses on transitive EPRs for which three choice-functional characterizations are given, two of them based on novel axioms. Transitive EPRs are shown to be rationalizable by sets of orderings that are “closed under compromise”; this novel requirement is argued to be the key to establish a canonical relationship between sets of orderings and choice-functions. The traditional assumption of “binariness” on preference relations or choice functions is shown to be analytically unhelpful and normatively unfounded; non-binariness may arise from “unresolvedness of preference”, a previously unrecognized aspect of preference incompleteness. Received: 28 August 1995/Accepted: 14 February 1996     

The mixed economy, the neoliberal challenge, and the negotiated economy

In recent years the ideal of the mixed economy has been challenged by neoliberal theories. This article reviews the debate. A better definition of the concept is presented and used to clarify what is at stake in the debate.     

Fast tensorial JADE

We propose a novel method for tensorial‐independent component analysis. Our approach is based on TJADE and k‐JADE, two recently proposed generalizations of the classical JADE algorithm. Our novel method achieves the consistency and the limiting distribution of TJADE under mild assumptions and at the same time offers notable improvement in computational speed. Detailed mathematical proofs of the statistical properties of our method are given and, as a special case, a conjecture on the properties of k‐JADE is resolved. Simulations and timing comparisons demonstrate remarkable gain in speed. Moreover, the desired efficiency is obtained approximately for finite samples. The method is applied successfully to large‐scale video data, for which neither TJADE nor k‐JADE is feasible. Finally, an experimental procedure is proposed to select the values of a set of tuning parameters. Supplementary material including the R‐code for running the examples and the proofs of the theoretical results is available online.     

The two-sample <Emphasis Type=Italic>t</Emphasis> test: pre-testing its assumptions does not pay off

Traditionally, when applying the two-sample t test, some pre-testing occurs. That is, the theory-based assumptions of normal distributions as well as of homogeneity of the variances are often tested in applied sciences in advance of the tried-for t test. But this paper shows that such pre-testing leads to unknown final type-I- and type-II-risks if the respective statistical tests are performed using the same set of observations. In order to get an impression of the extension of the resulting misinterpreted risks, some theoretical deductions are given and, in particular, a systematic simulation study is done. As a result, we propose that it is preferable to apply no pre-tests for the t test and no t test at all, but instead to use the Welch-test as a standard test: its power comes close to that of the t test when the variances are homogeneous, and for unequal variances and skewness values |γ ₁| < 3, it keeps the so called 20% robustness whereas the t test as well as Wilcoxon’s U test cannot be recommended for most cases.