Tasks,occupations and wages in OECD countries

This article investigates the links between earnings, human capital and job tasks, using internationally comparable information from the OECD Survey of Adult Skills. The authors use the theoretical framework developed by Autor and Handel (2013) and extend their empirical results to 21 OECD countries. The data allow for a richer characterization of workers' human capital by including both educational attainment and a measure of cognitive skills. Their findings confirm the predictive power of job tasks in explaining wage differences, both between and within occupations, and provide empirical support for the model's prediction in the vast majority of countries.     

NORMS OF PUNISHMENT: EXPERIMENTS WITH STUDENTS AND THE GENERAL POPULATION

Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an experiment with two subject pools sharing the same geographical and cultural origins, we show that opportunities for peer punishment increase cooperation among students but not in the general population. In previous studies, punishment magnified the differences across societies in people's ability to cooperate. Here, punishment reversed the order: with punishment, students cooperate more than the general population while they cooperate less without it. (JEL C72, C90, Z13)     

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. The underlying economy is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and increases in public production. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. Policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts. With the available policies, it is possible for the government to completely eliminate unemployment in the long run. However, with political decision making, the economy always has unemployment. Unemployment is higher when the private sector experiences negative shocks. When these shocks occur, the government employs debt‐financed fiscal stimulus plans which involve both tax cuts and public production increases. When the private sector is healthy, the government contracts debt until it reaches a floor level. Unemployment levels are weakly increasing in the economy's debt level, strictly so when the private sector experiences negative shocks. Conditional on the level of workers employed, the mix of public and private output is distorted.     

The Cyclical Volatility of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies: Evidence From Italy

In this study, we explore the fluctuations of unemployment and vacancies in the Italian labour market over the last 20 years. Relying on the available sources of data for unfilled job openings, we find that even in Italy, similarly to other developed countries, there is a clean evidence of the unemployment volatility puzzle. In other words, we empirically assess that the tightness indicator is significantly more volatile than productivity over the whole period. In addition, on the theoretical ground, we show that a matching model with segmented labour markets and on‐the‐job search has the potential to provide a rationale for this pattern.     

Intervention Research as Management Research in Practice: Learning from a Case in the Fashion Design Industry

Research in the field of management and organizational sciences has yielded a deeper understanding of many emerging business issues. However, the relevance of the contributions has been increasingly criticized, in both the academic and public spheres. We propose the intervention research approach – originally developed by the research group at Ecole des Mines de Paris – as a design science approach able to address both the relevance gap issue and the growing complexity of management practice. It is argued that increasing our understanding of management requires research that is more insightful, influential and immediately applicable. This in turn requires closer collaboration between management and researchers during the inquiry process, which is not always easy to achieve. An illustrative case study of an intervention research project focusing on creativity, conducted in Italy in collaboration with a fashion company, demonstrates how intervention research can be rigorous and relevant to practitioners, and how it can advance theoretical knowledge in management science.     

Is There Still a Wage Penalty for Being Overeducated But Well‐matched in Skills? A Panel Data Analysis of a Swiss Graduate Cohort

Using two periods' panel data from the Swiss Graduate Survey, this study examines the incidence, persistence and wage effects of overeducation. An alternative measure of overeducation that accounts for graduate heterogeneity in perceived skills mismatch is used. This analysis differs from previous panel data studies in that two estimation methods are applied to control for unobserved ability. Results indicate that graduates who are overeducated and mismatched in skills are the most penalized in terms of earnings. This evidence is still valid when unobserved ability is accounted for, whereas the pay penalty is no more significant for graduates who are overeducated but matched in skills. This result is robust to different definitions of perceived skills mismatch and is consistent with the notion that apparent overeducation reflects a lack of unobserved attributes, such as ability.     

Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players

When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.

     

On the effect of correlation and unequal variances in detecting a spurious observation

Srivastava (1980) has shown that Grubbs's (1950) test for a univariate outlier is robust against the effect of equicorrelation. In this note we extend Srivastava's result by giving a more general covariance structure, which relaxes both the covariance structure and the assumption of equal variances. We also show that under the more general covariance structure, the power of Grubbs's test, as well as the significance level, is identical to the independently and identically distributed case.