The seasons of a CEO's tenure

This article proposes a model of the dynamics of the CEO's tenure in office. The central argument is that there are discernible phases, or seasons, within an executive's tenure in a position, and that these seasons give rise to distinct patterns of executive attention, behavior, and, ultimately, organizational performance. The five delineated seasons are (a) response to mandate, (b) experimentation, (c) selection of an enduring theme, (d) convergence, and (e) dysfunction. The theoretical and practical implications of the model are discussed.     

Business restructuring,management control,and corporate organization

Conclusions After half a century of growing dominance of the large corporation by non-owning managers, the 1980s were marked by a slowing or even reversing of their quiet revolution. Professional managers had come to control the corporation on the premise that they could more efficiently produce shareholder value than the original founder-owners. They turned shareholding into a passive investment on the same premise. As companies faced increasingly competitive pressures during the 1980s, however, the legitimacy of the rule of incumbent management came under challenge. No longer could government interference be blamed for many of the problems facing business; fingers pointed at management itself. As the criticism of corporate leadership gathered momentum, a leading diagnosis focused on one of managerial capitalism's crowning achievements: the autonomous power of professional management.The critique viewed the managerial autonomy as excessively permissive, the agency system as no longer effective. Professional managers had come to show too much concern for the social welfare of various stakeholder groups, including themselves, and too little concern for the financial welfare of the only stakeholder group that should really count — the shareholders. Many of the restructuring efforts were thus undertaken in the name of returning companies to the single-minded pursuit of ownership interests. What had stood in the way of such a pursuit was less a matter of government constraint and more a matter of inadequate stockholder vigilance by their appointed agents.Mindful of the critique, incumbent managements moved during the mid- to late-1980s to improve stockholder returns by paring the workforce and cutting other costs. Corporate acquisitions and leveraged buyouts brought new management teams to the fore where others had seemingly fallen short. The resulting restructuring reached a large proportion of the nation's major companies. Half or more of the largest companies had undergone a significant reduction in their workforce. And the dollar value of company resources changing ownership hands expanded considerably. The aggregate purchase price of mergers and acquisitions of publicly-traded firms in 1988 was nearly three times greater than in 1981. Even more striking was the sharp increase in the number of publicly-traded companies and divisions that were taken private. The aggregate dollar value of such buyouts in 1988 had increased almost 25 times over that in 1981. This opening of the market for corporate control among major U.S. firms brought a significant fraction of the nation's large corporations more directly under the immediate oversight of ownership interests.The reassertion of ownership control over large corporations was usually taken in the name of improving corporate earnings. Would be takeover groups generally promised more internal discipline and stronger financial performance. Whatever the actual financial impact of the intensification of ownership interests, available research suggests that it has had organizational impact. General company strategies may come to be more centrally guided while specific operating actions are devolved further down the organization.Ownership change and other restructuring steps have also ramified into corporate social and political action. That outreach is likely to be less vigorous and more divided. It is also being redirected. During the 1970s and early 1980s, corporate energies focused on reducing government regulation and improving community opinion. Those energies are now increasingly focused on facilitating or resisting restructuring. Companies have fought legislation that would limit the process of plant closings, but they have also sought legislation to protect themselves against hostile takeovers.The evidence also suggests that considerable managerial discretion remains in shaping company response to the restructuring pressures. Although market and organizational factors are sure to act as constraints, top management, whether a relatively autonomous non-owning management group or an owner-dominated management, retains an important independent capacity to exercise strategic choice. That choice is likely to receive special shaping by the long-term ascendance of financial managers and the decline of manufacturing personnel at the executive level.Yet corporate change must not be viewed as isolated managerial responses to changing market conditions. Companies and managements frequently look to one another for guidance in coping with ambiguous circumstances. DiMaggio and Powell's analysis of organizational isomorphism, for example, suggests that firms frequently adopt organizational practices not because they are dictated by the firm's market strategies, but rather because they are already used by other companies. Similarly, Granovetter's analysis of the social embeddedness of economic action indicates that company decisions are partially shaped by top management's contacts with their counterparts in other firms. Understanding company responses to restructuring pressures therefore requires a focus on inter-company flows of ideas and doctrines as well as purely internally generated responses specific to the company. Reactions to the restructuring pressures that are collectively developed and defined in the broader business community may prove to be as critical as individually fashioned solutions in guiding management approaches to restructuring during the years to come.

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CONTEXT EFFECTS FOR CENSUS MEASURES OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN

This paper reports on the results of a split-ballot experimentconducted in 1987 to test alternative versions of the decennialcensus long form. Two forms were randomly assigned and self-administeredin group sessions involving a total of 515 respondents. Theorder of race and Hispanic origin items was experimentally manipulated.The standard long form asks race, then Hispanic origin. Theexperimental form reversed the order of the items in order toreduce perceived redundancy, and to create a more restrictedframe of reference for the race item. The objectives of thecontext manipulation were (1) to reduce item nonresponse forthe Hispanic origin item, and (2) to reduce reporting of "Otherrace" by Hispanics in the race item. Objective (1) was met.Objective (2) was met for Hispanics born in a U.S. state, butnot for immigrants. The results are interpreted as reflectinga process of acculturation that affects how Hispanic respondentsapply U.S. racial categories "white" and "black" in the census.     

Meeting the change challenge: managing growth in the nonprofit and public human services sectors

The current economic climate has been particularly hard on non-profit and public human services organizations, frequently resulting in managing organizational decline. The authors believe that the dominant concern should be with fostering organizational growth. To this end, they suggest that nonprofit board members and executives, as well as public sector leaders, need to concern themselves with the concurrent management of two agendas: Running the Shop and Meeting the Change Challenge. This can be done effectively through the use of strategic issue management, which is a set of techniques that represents a blend of traditional strategic management and change management approaches.     

Bridge employment and job stopping: evidence from the Harris/Commonwealth Fund Survey

This article analyzes a 1989 Louis Harris and Associates survey designed to elicit information on the employment histories and job-stopping behavior of men and women who then were approaching or had recently reached retirement age. The results indicate that retirement often occurs gradually and includes a substantial period of "bridge employment." Most bridge jobholders work full-time, by choice, and report high levels of job enjoyment. Occupational mobility occurring late in life typically involves upward movement, although the pattern of change is quite different when it takes place outside, rather than within, the longest job. The principal concern identified in this article is the limited ability of some groups of workers (nonwhites, females, the less educated, and those in poorly compensated occupations) to either retain longest jobs or to obtain acceptable bridge employment. Health problems also frequently lead to early departures from the labor force.