Interval scalability of rank-dependent utility

Luce and Narens (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 29:1–72, 1985) showed that rank-dependent utility (RDU) is the most general interval scale utility model for binary lotteries. It can be easily established that this result cannot be generalized to lotteries with more than two outcomes. This article suggests several additional conditions to ensure RDU as the only utility model with the desired property of interval scalability in the general case. The related axiomatizations of some special cases of RDU of independent interest (the quantile utility, expected utility, and Yaari’s dual expected utility) are also given.     

Strategic Consumer Cooperation in a Name‐Your‐Own‐Price Channel

Supplier reluctance to openly advertise highly discounted products on the Internet has stimulated development of “opaque” name‐Your‐Own‐Price sales channels. Unfortunately (for suppliers), there is significant potential for online consumers to exploit these channels through collaboration in social networks. In this paper, we study three possible forms of consumer collaboration: exchange of bid result information, coordinated bidding, and coordinated bidding with risk pooling. We propose an egalitarian total utility maximizing mechanism for coordination and risk pooling in a bidding club and describe characteristics of consumers for whom participation in the club makes sense. We show that, in the absence of risk pooling, a plausible bidding club strategy using just information exchange gives almost the same benefits to consumers as coordinated bidding. In contrast, coordinated bidding with risk pooling can lead to significantly increased benefits for consumers. The benefits of risk pooling are highest for consumers with a low tolerance to risk. We also demonstrate that suppliers that actively adjust for such strategic consumer behavior can reduce the impact on their businesses and, under some circumstances, even increase revenues.     

Uses of imagination: The Russian Jewish past and its afterlives in the new and old worlds

David G. Roskies, The Jewish Search for a Usable Past (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, 217pp.);

Steven J. Zipperstein, Imagining Russian Jewry: Memory, History, Identity (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999, 139pp.);

Veniamin Lukin, Boris Khaimovich, 700 evreiskikh mestechek Urkrainy: istoricheskii putevoditel’. Vypusk 1 : Podoliya (A Historical Guide to 100 Ukrainian Jewish Shtetls, No. 1 : Podolia) (Jerusalem‐St Petersburg; Ezro, 1997, 256pp.)     

Inertia in Russian Politics

Despite changes in values and in formal and symbolic structures, real reform of the Russian political system is hampered by institutional inertia.     

Semiparametric Regression Estimation in Copula Models

We consider some methods of semiparametric regression estimation in multivariate models when the common distribution function is represented using a copula and the marginals satisfy a generalized regression model using a transfer functional. Sufficient conditions for consistency and joint asymptotic normality of the finite-dimensional parameters are obtained.     

Penrose's criterion and pillai's statistic under non-normal theory

In this paper we show that pernrose's Criterion is equivalent to pillai's Statistic under non-normal assumptions. Furthermore, we prove that under normal assumptions the first tow moments of Penrose's Criterion are identical to those of pillai's Statistic, specifically for p = 2.     

Outsourcing Manufacturing: Secure Price‐Masking Mechanisms for Purchasing Component Parts

This paper develops and tests a privacy‐preserving business process that supports the selection of a contract manufacturer by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), and the determination of whether the OEM or the chosen contract manufacturer will procure each of the components to be used in the manufacture of the OEM's branded product. Our “secure price‐masking (SPM)” technology contributes to procurement theory and practice in four significant ways: First, it preserves the privacy of every party's individual component prices. Second, SPM assures that the contract manufacturers will bid their own private purchase cost (i.e., not add a margin to their cost). Third, SPM is not invertible; i.e., none of the participants can “solve” for the private inputs of any other participant based on its own inputs and the outputs provided to it by SPM. Fourth, the posterior distribution of any other participant's private inputs is practically indistinguishable from its prior distribution. We also describe the results of a proof‐of‐concept implementation.     

Combinatorial design of a minimum cost transfer line

The problem of equipment selection for a production line is considered. Each piece of equipment, also called unit or block, performs a set of operations. All necessary operations of the line and all available blocks with their costs are known. The difficulty is to choose the most appropriate blocks and group them into (work)stations. There are some constraints that restrict the assignment of different blocks to the same station. Two combinatorial approaches for solving this problem are suggested. Both are based on a novel concept of locally feasible stations. The first approach combinatorially enumerates all feasible solutions, and the second reduces the problem to search for a maximum weight clique. A boolean linear program based on a set packing formulation is presented. Computer experiments with benchmark data are described. Their results show that the set packing model is competitive and can be used to solve real-life problems.     

Scalable Dynamic Bid Prices for Network Revenue Management in Continuous Time

This study develops an approximate optimal control problem to produce time‐dependent bid prices for the airline network revenue management problem. The main contributions of our study are the analysis of time‐dependent bid prices in continuous time and the use of splines to modify the problem into an approximate second‐order cone program (ASOCP). The spline representation of bid prices permits the number of variables to depend solely on the number of resources and not on the size of the booking horizon. The advantage of this framework is the ASOCP's scalability, which we demonstrate by solving for bid prices on an industrial‐sized network. The numerical experiments highlight the ASOCP's ability to solve industrial sized problems in seconds.