The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private‐value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participation constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. In an environment with diverse preferences it is the unique mechanism satisfying ex post incentive, ex post participation, and efficient exit conditions. We develop the dynamic pivot mechanism in detail for a repeated auction of a single object in which each bidder learns over time her true valuation of the object. The dynamic pivot mechanism here is equivalent to a modified second price auction.     

Synergy evaluation of non-normalizable dose–response data: Generalization of combination index for the linear effect of drugs

The study of drug synergy plays a prominent role in the search for drug combinations with beneficial interactions. Firstly, in this process, the drug-effect response of individual parts and the mixture needs to be derived. This function is usually well described by Hill (or other logistic or sigmoid) curve. Due to its boundedness, it allows the measured data to be normalized. The normalized data can then be processed by interaction analysis using the Loewe, Bliss, or other models to evaluate possible synergy or antagonism of two or more drugs. However, sometimes, the drug-effect responses observed in pharmaceutical research do not appear to be bounded. Theoretically, the drug-effect curve cannot grow to infinity, but it may be impossible to determine its upper bound within the observed region. In this case, standard models cannot be used, since they assume that data are normalized. The approach of this article bypasses the need to normalize the data, allowing its broader application and usefulness in finding potential synergies in pharmaceutical research.     

Reexamining economic sociology: Beyond rational choice reductionism

The article aims at reexamining the origins and character of economic sociology by comparison with rational choice within the history of economic and social ideas, particularly neoclassical economic and classical sociological theory. Some suggestions for a rational choice approach to economic sociology are particularly curious in that they tend to conflate the distinct characters and origins of these two disciplines throughout this history and have in turn provided an impetus for this reexamination. Modern rational choice theorists display a predilection for reducing economic (and, all) sociology into an economic approach to human behavior, with many economic sociologists evincing some degree of lenience or benevolence vis-à-vis such tendencies. Both tendencies do not seem justified in light of the different nature and origin of economic sociology and rational choice in the history of social and economic ideas. Since the current literature lacks coherent attempts at specifying the nature and historical roots of economic sociology versus those of rational choice, the article contributes toward filling in this hole.     

Collective‐unconscious apologetics of plutocracy and oligarchy: Chicago economics' ideological preferences revealed by the sociology of knowledge

The article places and analyzes the Chicago school of economics within the framework of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge or ideas that posits and documents social determinants of ideas and ideologies. This framework reveals the Chicago school as the explicit or implicit ideology and utopia of plutocracy, oligarchy and aristocracy in the sense of apologetics of these social classes and/or systems, thus being the class form of ‘apologetic economics’. Specifically, first, Chicago economics reveals itself as the collective‐unconscious apologetics of plutocracy, oligarchy and aristocracy. Second, it appears as the ‘collective‐conscious’ apologetics in this respect. In addition, it come close to the mostly covert collective‐unconscious or conscious apologetics of theocracy and fascism. The article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the social, in particular class, factors of Chicago and related schools of economics and generally of economic ideas, theories and policies by applying Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, especially its emphasis on the collective unconscious as the source of ideology.     

Biased estimation of a variance

Summary Let , whereX _i are i.i.d. random variables with a finite variance σ² and is the usual estimate of the mean ofX _i. We consider the problem of finding optimal α with respect to the minimization of the expected value of |S ²(σ)−σ²|^k for variousk and with respect to Pitman's nearness criterion. For the Gaussian case analytical results are obtained and for some non-Gaussian cases we present Monte Carlo results regarding Pitman's criteron. This research was supported by Science Fund of Serbia, grant number 04M03, through Mathematical Institute, Belgrade.