International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

Statistical consulting

The paper and the special issue focus on the activity of statistical consulting and its varieties. This includes academic consulting, consulting to and in industry as well as statistics in public media.     

A Sparse Implementation of the Average Information Algorithm for Factor Analytic and Reduced Rank Variance Models

Factor analytic variance models have been widely considered for the analysis of multivariate data particularly in the psychometrics area. Recently Smith, Cullis & Thompson (2001) have considered their use in the analysis of multi‐environment data arising from plant improvement programs. For these data, the size of the problem and the complexity of the variance models chosen to account for spatial heterogeneity within trials implies that standard algorithms for fitting factor analytic models can be computationally expensive. This paper presents a sparse implementation of the average information algorithm (Gilmour, Thompson & Cullis, 1995) for fitting factor analytic and reduced rank variance models.     

New Labour and youth justice

The paper discusses the reasons for the large amount of critical commentary that New Labour's reforms of the youth justice system have attracted. It explores the extent to which there is something ‘new’ about these reforms, suggesting that there are important differences when New Labour's approach is compared with its predecessor's. It then discusses the main lines of critical commentary on the reforms, concluding that much of it is over‐abstract and insufficiently empirically informed. The paper concludes with some ambiguous evidence on what the impact of the reforms has actually been. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some results on optimality in models with heteroscedastic errors from partial optimum designs

This paper studies optimum designs for linear models when the errors are heteroscedastic. Sufficient conditions are given in order to obtainD-, A- andE-optimum designs for a complete regression model from partial optimum designs for some sub-parameters. A result about optimality for a complete model from the optimality for the submodels is included. Supported by Junta de Andalucía, research group FQM244.     

A “brer rabbit” case for reverse mandated benefits

Reverse mandated benefits is a government-mandated policy that requires employees to provide their employers with benefits that workers would not provide otherwise. Of course, only those benefits would be mandated that are worth more to employers than they cost, as determined by political authorities. My case for such a policy argues that it is at least as sensible as policies mandating that employers provide benefits to their employees that would not be provided otherwise.