The effect of aging and tennis playing on coincidence-timing accuracy

This study examined the effect of tennis playing on the coincidence timing (CT) of older adults. Young, younger-old and older-old (20-30, 60-69, and 70-79 years old, respectively) tennis players and nonplayers were asked to synchronize a simple response (pressing a button) with the arrival of a moving stimulus at a target. Results showed that the older tennis players responded with a slight bias similar to that of the young players. Two experiments were conducted to determine whether the elimination of age effects through tennis playing was a result of maintaining basic perceptuomotor and perceptual processes or of some possible compensation strategy. The results revealed that the age-related increase in the visuomotor delay was significantly correlated with CT performance in older nonplayers but not in older tennis players. These results suggest that playing tennis is beneficial to older adults, insofar as they remained as accurate as younger ones despite less efficient perceptuomotor processes. This supports the compensation hypothesis.     

The Working Families’ Tax Credit and Some European Tax Reforms in A Collective Setting

A framework for simplified implementation of the collective model of labor supply decisions is presented in the context of fiscal reforms in the UK. Through its collective form the model accounts for the well known problem of distribution between wallet and purse, a broadly debated issue which has so far been impossible to model due to the limitations of the unitary model of household behavior. A calibrated data set is used to model the effects of introducing two forms of the Working Families’ Tax Credit. We also summarize results of estimations and calibrations obtained using the same methodology on data from five other European countries. The results underline the importance of taking account of the intrahousehold decision process and suggest that who receives government transfers does matter from the point of view of labor supply and welfare of household members. They also highlight the need for more research into models of household behavior.

Collective Models of Labor Supply with Nonconvex Budget Sets and Nonparticipation: A Calibration Approach

We suggest a methodology to calibrate a collective model with household-specific bargaining rules and marriage-specific preferences that incorporate leisure externalities. The empirical identification relies on the assumption that some aspects of individual preferences remain the same after marriage, so that estimation on single individuals can be used. The procedure maps the complete Pareto frontier of each household in the dataset and we define alternative measures of a power index. The latter is then regressed on relevant bargaining factors, including a set of variables retracing the potential relative contributions of the spouses to household disposable income. In its capacity to handle complex budget sets and labor force participation decisions of both spouses, this framework allows the comparison of unitary and collective predictions of labor supply reactions and welfare changes entailed by fiscal reforms in a realistic setting (see Michal Myck et al., 2006; Denis Beninger et al., 2006).

Estimation of slowly time-varying trend function in long memory regression models

ABSTRACT

We study the asymptotic properties of the least-squares estimator for the trend function of a particular class of locally stationary models, which are defined by considering a smooth variation of the trend function. Additionally, errors are assumed to be realizations from a long-range dependent stationary Gaussian process. Our findings are then illustrated through Monte Carlo simulations.     

Social Learning in One‐Arm Bandit Problems

We study a two‐player one‐arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and provide several qualitative results on the sequence of cutoffs.     

A new universal resample-stable bootstrap-based stopping criterion for PLS component construction

We develop a new robust stopping criterion for partial least squares regression (PLSR) component construction, characterized by a high level of stability. This new criterion is universal since it is suitable both for PLSR and extensions to generalized linear regression (PLSGLR). The criterion is based on a non-parametric bootstrap technique and must be computed algorithmically. It allows the testing of each successive component at a preset significance level \(\alpha \). In order to assess its performance and robustness with respect to various noise levels, we perform dataset simulations in which there is a preset and known number of components. These simulations are carried out for datasets characterized both by \(n>p\), with n the number of subjects and p the number of covariates, as well as for \(n<p\). We then use t-tests to compare the predictive performance of our approach with other common criteria. The stability property is in particular tested through re-sampling processes on a real allelotyping dataset. An important additional conclusion is that this new criterion gives globally better predictive performances than existing ones in both the PLSR and PLSGLR (logistic and poisson) frameworks.     

OPTIMAL EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP CONTRACTS UNDER AMBIGUITY AVERSION

The aim of this paper is to compute and describe the conditions of an optimal employee ownership contract between an employer and an ambiguity‐averse employee. We then introduce ambiguity aversion in the baseline model of Aubert et al. (2014) using the multiple prior preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and its extension proposed by Maccheroni et al. (2006). This model offers solutions that reconcile labor and financial economics and behavioral economics research findings on employee ownership. The paper focuses on the most common situation where employee ownership has a positive impact on corporate performance, but can also be used as an entrenchment mechanism. We determine the optimal company stock contribution, which corresponds to a perfect subgame Nash equilibrium in the ambiguity framework. Using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we show that the optimal ownership contract is increasing with respect to the lower bound of the return expectation in the case of a high level of effort, and decreasing with respect to the upper bound of the return expectation in the case of a low level of effort. In the framework of Maccheroni et al. (2006), we prove that if aversion to ambiguity is sufficiently high, then we find the same behavior as in the case of no ambiguity. (JEL G11, G32, G34, J33)