Heteroscedastic Global Tests that the Regression Parameters for Two or More Independent Groups are Identical

Simulation results are reported on methods that allow both within group and between group heteroscedasticity when testing the hypothesis that independent groups have identical regression parameters. The methods are based on a combination of extant techniques, but their finite-sample properties have not been studied. Included are results on the impact of removing all leverage points or just bad leverage points. The method used to identify leverage points can be important and can improve control over the Type I error probability. Results are illustrated using data from the Well Elderly II study.     

How Welfare Policies Affect Adolescents' School Outcomes: A Synthesis of Evidence From Experimental Studies

Using data from 8 random assignment studies and employing meta‐analytic techniques, this article provides systematic evidence that welfare and work policies targeted at low‐income parents have small adverse effects on some school outcomes among adolescents ages 12 to 18 years at follow‐up. These adverse effects were observed mostly for school performance outcomes and occurred in programs that required mothers to work or participate in employment‐related activities and those that encouraged mothers to work voluntarily. The most pronounced negative effects on school outcomes occurred for the group of adolescents who had a younger sibling, possibly because of the increased home and sibling care responsibilities they assumed as their mothers increased their employment.     

The Market Provision of Management Services, Information Asymmetries and Service Quality—Some Market Solutions: an Empirical Example

This article examines the problems of information asymmetry associated with the market provision of managerial services. Such problems are heightened by those characteristics which differentiate services from goods. Two unique, and central, characteristics of services, are intangibility and perishability. These create special problems for the market provision of services. In particular they make for difficulties in assessing quality; whereas the producer may know product quality, the buyer often does not. The asymmetry between sellers and buyers is of two types: Adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when the buyer cannot observe the relevant characteristics of the seller or the conditions under which they work. The problem of moral hazard is the buyer's inability to observe the action taken by the sellers. If these difficulties are not overcome, the market could collapse as companies withdraw and internalize service provision. However, each market has a number of in-built mechanisms which remedy the harmful effects associated with information-related problems. The institutional arrangements which predominate in particular markets are dependent upon the trust-producing mechanisms within those markets. Consequently, market responses to information asymmetries are far from uniform. The argument is illustrated using the example of the executive recruitment industry. In this respect the paper is a highly focused study of those mechanisms which overcome information asymmetries in one service market.     

Pulling together: building a community debriefing team.

1. Research shows that many emergency workers are affected physically and emotionally by critical incident stress. 2. Debriefings conducted by trained team members are an effective method to mitigate the impact of critical incident stress. A debriefing is a structured, time-limited group intervention. 3. Cooperation among community agencies is essential for the development and effective functioning of a critical incident stress debriefing team. 4. Several teams in Illinois have organized to form a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Network. The Illinois network is part of an international organization composed of critical incident stress debriefing providers.