The C1 topology on the space of smooth preference profiles

This paper defines a fine C ¹-topology for smooth preferences on a “policy space”, W, and shows that the set of convex preference profiles contains open sets in this topology.  It follows that if the dimension(W)≤v(?)−2 (where v(?) is the Nakamura number of the voting rule, ?), then the core of ? cannot be generically empty. For higher dimensions, an “extension” of the voting core, called the heart of ?, is proposed. The heart is a generalization of the “uncovered set”. It is shown to be non-empty and closed in general. On the C ¹-space of convex preference profiles, the heart is Paretian. Moreover, the heart correspondence is lower hemi-continuous and admits a continuous selection. Thus the heart converges to the core when the latter exists. Using this, an aggregator, compatible with ?, can be defined and shown to be continuous on the C ¹-space of smooth convex preference profiles. Received: 3 April 1995/Accepted: 8 April 1998     

Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey

Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for the phenomenon of political divergence, this paper offers a stochastic electoral model where party leaders or candidates are differentiated by differing valences??the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. If valence is simply intrinsic, then it can be shown that there is a ??convergence coefficient??, defined in terms of the empirical parameters, that must be bounded above by the dimension of the space, in order for the electoral mean to be a Nash equilibrium. This model is applied to elections in Turkey in 1999 and 2002. The idea of valence is then extended to include the possibility that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, must balance a centripetal electoral force against a centrifugal activist effect. We estimate pure spatial models and models with sociodemographic valences, and use simulations to compare the equilibrium predictions with the estimated party positions.     

Union administrative practices: A comparative analysis

In response to growing challenges, many labor organizations are reevaluating themselves in an effort to become more efficient and effective. Their efforts, however, are limited by their frames of reference. Seldom do unions compare practices across labor movements. To expand these frames of reference we compare union administrative practices in three countries: Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Two specific areas of union administration are examined — human resource/personnel practices and strategic planning. Results from these countries are presented and analyzed to identify and explain similarities and differences.     

D-optimal mixture component-amount designs for quadratic and cubic models

When the total amount of a mixture of ingredients needs to be taken into account (in addition to the composition of its ingredients), an experimental design requires several levels of the amount. Designs for such situations are discussed, and D-optimal choices are made for fitting quadratic and cubic models, for various numbers of experimental units.     

Inspection errors in graff-roeloffs modification of hierarchical dorfman screening procedures

Graff and Roeloffs' (1972) modification of the Dorfman (1943) screening procedure, and their analysis of the effects of inspection error on properties of the procedure, is extended to hierarchical procedures, using the results of Kotz and Johnson (1982).     

Quota fulfilment and errors in stratification

It is desired to draw a random sample containing specified numbers of individuals from each stratum of a population. First a random sample of size N is chosen from the whole populations and the stratum of each individual ascertained; then any shortfall is made up by selecting individuals with known stratum affiliation. Optimal values of N are sought allowing for cost structure and also the possibility of error in ascertaining the strata to which individuals in the first sample belong.