Board size and corporate performance: the missing role of board leadership structure

Different arguments have been introduced in the literature both for and against large and small board sizes. In this context, empirical evidence regarding the impact of board size on corporate performance is less conclusive, which means that further study is needed. Contrary to previous work, it is hypothesized in this study that the relationship between board size and corporate performance is more likely to be confounded by board leadership structure. Econometric analysis provided strong evidence for the applicability of this hypothesis and demonstrated that board size positively affects corporate performance in the presence of CEO non-duality (board leadership structure that is split between the roles of the CEO and the roles of the chairman). Furthermore, board size is shown to have a negative influence on corporate performance in the presence of CEO duality (board leadership structure that assigns the roles of both CEO and chairman to the same person). This conclusion is robust to the use of different measures of corporate performance, control variables and econometric models. Thus, these findings cast doubt on most of the existing evidence that posits that either large or small board size is always the best alternative to be followed in all organizations.     

Population monotonic path schemes for simple games

A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand. Obviously, each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the Shapley allocation scheme of the game is population monotonic in the sense of Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We prove that a simple game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced. Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition. We also show that each Shapley path scheme of a simple game is population monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. Extensions of these results to other efficient probabilistic values are discussed.     

Simple methods for evaluating and comparing binary experiments

We consider a confidence parametrization of binary information sources in terms of appropriate likelihood ratios. This parametrization is used for Bayesian belief updates and for the equivalent comparison of binary experiments. In contrast to the standard parametrization of a binary information source in terms of its specificity and its sensitivity, one of the two confidence parameters is sufficient for a Bayesian belief update conditional on a signal realization. We introduce a confidence-augmented receiver operating characteristic for comparisons of binary experiments for a class of “balanced” decision problems, relative to which the confidence order offers a higher resolution than Blackwell’s informativeness order.

Where observation is concerned, Chance favors only the prepared mind. —Louis Pasteur (1822–1895).

     

Delivery of Devolve Social Services: Its Contributions to the Socio-economic Conditions of Women in Columbio Sultan Kudarat

This is an evaluative study on the delivery of devolved programs in health, agriculture and social welfare. It aimed to identify the major devolved programs/projects implemented by the LGU of Columbio, Sultan Kudarat; the responsiveness of the actual delivery of devolve services in terms of human resources, facilities and fund allocation; the status of devolve services implemented if it was effective and efficient; and the inadequacies encountered. The “expose facto” method of research was used. There were 49 implementers and 132 beneficiaries of the various devolved programs. There were 181 total respondents. A four-part questionnaire was constructed and the gathered data were supplemented by information extracted through interviews with Key Informants, Focus Group Discussions and document analysis. There were three departments implementing the devolved social services programs such as the Municipal Health Office with 6 devolved health programs; the Municipal Agriculturist Office with 6 devolved agricultural projects; and the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office with 7 devolved social welfare programs. The respondents rated the implementation of devolve services in health, agriculture and social welfare programs between rank 5 to 9 for the aspects of human resources, facilities and fund allocations. The respondents assessed the implementation of devolved programs as Very Efficient and Most Responsive programs to the needs of the people specially the children, youths and women. The study also found some inadequacies observed during the implementation of devolved social services programs which were Agreed by the majority of the respondents. These findings implied that the implementation of various devolved social services for several years has made a significant difference in the lives of the people of the Municipality of Columbio, Sultan Kudarat, the Local Government of Columbio and program implementers with their commitment and solidarity to serve the people especially the marginalized is a manifestation of their unselfish dedication to uplift the socio-economic condition and well-being of the people. Hence, continuing projects should further be strengthened and supported to ensure the sustainability of the projects even if the support of different institutions has been terminated.     

Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard,long-term care insurance,and nursing home use

Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard occurs (i) if the parent’s decision to purchase long-term care (LTC) coverage undermines the child’s incentive to exert effort because the insurance protects the bequest from the cost of nursing home care, and (ii) when the parent purchases less LTC coverage, relying on child’s effort to keep him out of the nursing home. However, a “net” moral hazard effect obtains only if the two players’ responses to exogenous shocks fail to neutralize each other, entailing a negative relationship between child’s effort and parental LTC coverage. We focus on outcomes out of equilibrium, interpreting them as a break in the relationship resulting in no informal care provided and hence high probability nursing home admission. Changes in the parent’s initial wealth, LTC subsidy received, and child’s expected inheritance are shown to induce “net” moral hazard, in contradistinction to changes in child’s opportunity cost and share in the bequest.     

Beliefs about overconfidence

This experiment elicits beliefs about other people’s overconfidence and abilities. We find that most people believe that others are unbiased, and only few think that others are overconfident. There is a remarkable heterogeneity between these groups. Those people who think others are underconfident or unbiased are overconfident themselves. Those who think others are overconfident are underconfident themselves. Despite this heterogeneity, people overestimate on average the abilities of others as they do their own ability. One driving force behind this result is the refusal to process information about oneself: not only does this lead to overestimation of one’s own ability, but by means of social projection also to overestimation of others’ abilities.     

Clinical Assessment of Canadian Military Marriages

This theoretical discussion shed lights on the elements that impact on Canadian military marriages. A case example is presented to illustrate the value of using the strengths perspective, systems theory and attachment theory when assessing couples in this group. It further demonstrates how different assessment approaches produce significantly varied treatment plans.     

More on the stable,generalized stable,absorbing and admissible sets

We show the necessary and sufficient conditions for any two of the sets of stable, generalized stable, absorbing or admissible sets of an abstract decision problem to coincide. We show that all these conditions can be written as depending only on the number of predecessors or successors of some alternatives.     

Choosing monetary sequences: theory and experimental evidence

We formulate and investigate experimentally a model of how individuals choose between time sequences of monetary outcomes. The model assumes that a decision maker uses, sequentially, two criteria to screen options. Each criterion only permits a decision between some pairs of options, while the other options are incomparable according to that criterion. When the first criterion is not decisive, the decision maker resorts to the second criterion to select an alternative. We find that: (1) traditional economic models based on discounting alone cannot explain a significant (almost 30%) proportion of the data no matter how much variability in the discount functions is allowed; (2) our model, despite considering only a specific (exponential) form of discounting, can explain the data much better solely thanks to the use of the secondary criterion; (3) our model explains certain specific patterns in the choices of the “irrational” people. We reject the hypothesis that anomalous behavior is due simply to random “mistakes” around the basic predictions of discounting theories: deviations are not random and there are clear systematic patterns of association between “irrational” choices.