Earnings of Chinese Immigrants in the Enclave and Mainstream Economy*

La documentation sur le sujet n'est pas décisive quant à savoir si léconomie ethnique enclavée enregistre un rendement économique comparable chez les travailleurs et les entrepreneurs immigrants à ceux qui se situent dans le courant économique principal. Les auteurs de cette étude utilisent des données du Recensement du Canada de 2001 sur la langue la plus utilisée au travail din de mesurer la participation des immigrants chinois à léconomie enclavée. Après les avoir comparés au capital humain ainsi qu'aux variations liées au travail et au milieu urbain, les résultats démontrent que le rendement est moins élevé chez les hommes et chez les femmes de l'enclave que celui des gens qui se trouvent dans le courant économique principal. Les caractéristiques de la langue et le type de travail qui s'effectue dans léconomie enclavée expliquent pourquoi le rendement y est inférieur à celui obtenu dans le courant économique principal. The literature in inconclusive as to whether the immigrant enclave economy offers returns to immigrant workers and entrepreneurs comparative to those in the mainstream economy. This study uses data from the 2001 Census of Canada on language most often used at work to measure enclave economy participation for Chinese immigrants. The findings show that returns are lower for men or women in the enclave than those in the mainstream economy, respectively, after controlling for human capital, work‐related and urban variations. Language features of and job type in the enclave economy explain why returns are inferior to that of the mainstream economy.     

The Development of Anticipatory Smiling

When do infants begin to communicate positive affect about physical objects to their social partners? We examined developmental changes in the timing of smiles during episodes of initiating joint attention that involved an infant gazing between an object and a social partner. Twenty‐six typically developing infants were observed at 8, 10, and 12 months during the Early Social‐Communication Scales, a semistructured assessment for eliciting initiating joint attention and related behaviors. The proportion of infant smiling during initiating joint attention episodes did not change with age, but there was a change in the timing of the smiles. The likelihood of infants smiling at an object and then gazing at the experimenter while smiling (anticipatory smiling) increased between 8 and 10 months and remained stable between 10 and 12 months. The increase in the number of infants who smiled at an object and then made eye contact suggests a developing ability to communicate positive affect about an object.     

Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule. Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002 This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

A “brer rabbit” case for reverse mandated benefits

Reverse mandated benefits is a government-mandated policy that requires employees to provide their employers with benefits that workers would not provide otherwise. Of course, only those benefits would be mandated that are worth more to employers than they cost, as determined by political authorities. My case for such a policy argues that it is at least as sensible as policies mandating that employers provide benefits to their employees that would not be provided otherwise.