全球视野中的西方历史思想:十个命题

所谓“西方”,本身是一个历史的建构。欧洲特定的文化背景,历史上一系列的文化及社会运动,对历史思想和历史书写都产生了重大影响,使得西方史学具有了一定程度上的独特性,譬如强调进步和发展等等。然而这种独特性并不是一连串独一无二的特征,也不意味着西方历史著作的方式在所有方面都优于其他方式。归根到底,正是不同体系之间的冲突,尤其是不同“力量”之间的动态平衡,才构成西方历史思想和历史书写的特点。     

TWO-PIECE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN UTILITY FUNCTIONS*

Thirty empirically assessed utility functions on changes in wealth or return on investment were examined for general features and susceptability to fits by linear, power, and exponential functions. Separate fits were made to below-target data and above-target data. The usual “target” was the no-change point. The majority of below-target functions were risk seeking; the majority of above-target functions were risk averse; and the most common composite shape was convex-concave, or risk seeking in losses and risk averse in gains. The least common composite was concave-concave. Below-target utility was generally steeper than above-target utility with a median below-to-above slope ratio of about 4.8. The power and exponential fits were substantially better than the linear fits. Power functions gave the best fits in the majority of convex below-target and concave above-target cases, and exponential functions gave the best fits in the majority of concave below-target and convex above-target cases. Several implications of these results for decision making under risk are mentioned.     

Population monotonic path schemes for simple games

A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand. Obviously, each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the Shapley allocation scheme of the game is population monotonic in the sense of Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We prove that a simple game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced. Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition. We also show that each Shapley path scheme of a simple game is population monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. Extensions of these results to other efficient probabilistic values are discussed.     

Demand for health risk reductions: A cross-national comparison between the U.S. and Canada

Using a large stated preference survey conducted across the U.S. and Canada, we assess differences in individual willingness to pay (WTP) for health risk reductions between the two countries. Our utility-theoretic choice model allows for systematically varying marginal utilities for avoided future time in different adverse health states (illness-years, recovered/remission years, and lost life-years). We find significant differences between Canadian and U.S. preferences. WTP also differs systematically with age, gender, education, and marital status, as well as a number of attitudinal and subjective health-perception variables. Age profiles for WTP are markedly different across the two countries. Canadians tend to display flatter age profiles, with peak WTP realized at older ages.     

Dynamic reasoning and time pressure: Transition from analytical operations to experiential responses

Based upon the Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993), we tested a model of dynamic reasoning to predict the effect of time pressure on analytical and experiential processing during decision-making. Forty-six participants were required to make investment decisions under four levels of time pressure. In each decision, participants were presented with experiential cues which were either congruent or incongruent with the analytical information. The congruent/incongruent conditions allowed us to examine how many decisions were based upon the experiential versus the analytical information, and to see if this was affected by the varying degrees of time pressure. As expected, the overall accuracy was reduced with greater time pressure and accuracy was higher when the experiential and analytical cues were congruent than when they were incongruent. Of great interest was the data showing that under high time pressure participants used more experiential cues than at other time pressures. We suggest that the dynamic reasoning paradigm has some future potential for predicting the effects of experiential biases in general, and specifically under time pressure.     

Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard,long-term care insurance,and nursing home use

Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard occurs (i) if the parent’s decision to purchase long-term care (LTC) coverage undermines the child’s incentive to exert effort because the insurance protects the bequest from the cost of nursing home care, and (ii) when the parent purchases less LTC coverage, relying on child’s effort to keep him out of the nursing home. However, a “net” moral hazard effect obtains only if the two players’ responses to exogenous shocks fail to neutralize each other, entailing a negative relationship between child’s effort and parental LTC coverage. We focus on outcomes out of equilibrium, interpreting them as a break in the relationship resulting in no informal care provided and hence high probability nursing home admission. Changes in the parent’s initial wealth, LTC subsidy received, and child’s expected inheritance are shown to induce “net” moral hazard, in contradistinction to changes in child’s opportunity cost and share in the bequest.     

Can we count on each other? Reciprocity and conflicts in financial support in Sweden

Espvall M, Dellgran P. Can we count on each other? Reciprocity and conflicts in financial support in Sweden
Int J Soc Welfare 2010: 19: 84–94 © 2008 The Author(s), Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the International Journal of Social Welfare. This article explores the experiences of reciprocity and conflicts in social relationships, and how these experiences are related to financial support (loans and gifts) in the wider social network. The balance of exchange within the social network as a whole is considered in relation to socio‐demographic features, financial conditions and the availability of social relationships. The data are drawn from a study of financial support exchange in Sweden based on a representative survey among Swedish citizens (n= 500). The results reveal that people living in economic hardship and who have more problematic life circumstances appear to be at risk of receiving more limited informal financial support and experience more feelings of conflict and nonreciprocal social relations.     

Identifying Latent Structures in Panel Data

This paper provides a novel mechanism for identifying and estimating latent group structures in panel data using penalized techniques. We consider both linear and nonlinear models where the regression coefficients are heterogeneous across groups but homogeneous within a group and the group membership is unknown. Two approaches are considered—penalized profile likelihood (PPL) estimation for the general nonlinear models without endogenous regressors, and penalized GMM (PGMM) estimation for linear models with endogeneity. In both cases, we develop a new variant of Lasso called classifier‐Lasso (C‐Lasso) that serves to shrink individual coefficients to the unknown group‐specific coefficients. C‐Lasso achieves simultaneous classification and consistent estimation in a single step and the classification exhibits the desirable property of uniform consistency. For PPL estimation, C‐Lasso also achieves the oracle property so that group‐specific parameter estimators are asymptotically equivalent to infeasible estimators that use individual group identity information. For PGMM estimation, the oracle property of C‐Lasso is preserved in some special cases. Simulations demonstrate good finite‐sample performance of the approach in both classification and estimation. Empirical applications to both linear and nonlinear models are presented.