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91.
Parenthood postponement is a key demographic trend of the last three decades. In order to rationalize that stylized fact, we extend the canonical model by Barro and Becker (Econometrica 57:481–501, 1989) to include two—instead of one—reproduction periods. We examine how the cost structure of early and late children in terms of time and goods affects the optimal fertility timing. Then, we identify conditions that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium with a stationary cohort size. Finally, we examine how the model can rationalize the observed postponement of births, and we highlight two plausible causes: (1) a general rise in the cost of children in terms of goods and (2) a decline in the degree of family altruism. 相似文献
92.
This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time‐inconsistent preferences with a present bias toward public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. We analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent. Unlike under independent and identically distributed shocks, we show that the ex ante optimal rule is not sequentially optimal, as it provides dynamic incentives. The ex ante optimal rule exhibits history dependence, with high shocks leading to an erosion of future fiscal discipline compared to low shocks, which lead to the reinstatement of discipline. The implied policy distortions oscillate over time given a sequence of high shocks, and can force the government to accumulate maximal debt and become immiserated in the long run. 相似文献
93.
94.
David A. Waldman Pierre A. Balthazard Suzanne J. Peterson 《The Leadership Quarterly》2011,22(6):1092-1106
We provide an overview of how the emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience can be linked to leadership theory and practice. A number of challenges are addressed, including theory development, as well as technical, measurement and methodological issues. In addition, we review recent leadership research that involves neuroscience applications, as well as areas that are closely related to leadership, such as emotional regulation and ethical reasoning and decision-making. Consideration is also given to how neuroscience might inform leadership development processes. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional challenges in conducting leadership research that incorporates neuroscience, and we consider potential limitations of such applications. 相似文献
95.
Political influences on short-term interest rates in seventeen OECD countries from 1960–1990 are measured. After controlling for unexpected changes in inflation and unemployment, as well as changes in the world interest rate, short-term interest rates in most countries do not respond to political events, neither the timing of elections nor changes in the governing party. Thus, on this criterion, the central banks in this sample do not reveal large differences in their degree of independence from political influence. The small differences are not closely related to rankings of central bank independence based on quantification of central bank laws. 相似文献
96.
97.
Pierre de Trenqualye 《Social Choice and Welfare》1997,15(1):141-159
We ask in this paper about the effect on social decisions of limiting the size of changes that voters may propose each time
in an otherwise standard dynamic social choice model. The voting rule we study can be seen as an extension of Bowen’s dynamic
“majority voting” rule, and is closely related to the dynamic procedures for public good allocation in the literature (Drèze
and de la Vallée Poussin 1971; Malinvaud 1971; Laffont and Maskin 1983; Chander 1993). Under general assumptions we prove
existence and Pareto efficiency of equilibrium, and show that our rule motivates voters not to misrepresent preferences (more
precisely, the rule is Strongly Locally Individually Incentive Compatible). Under Euclidean preferences we find that electoral
cycles do not arise (i.e., the rule is convergent), that there is a unique equilibrium, and that the equilibrium coincides
with the solution to an old problem of geometry, first addressed by Fermat, Torricelli, and Cavallieri.
Received: 20 September 1994/Accepted: 6 August 1996 相似文献
98.
99.
A typology of electoral environments in which strategic manipulation of voting rules can occur is proposed. From this typology, six different concepts of equilibria (or quasi-equilibria) are defined, including the usual ones. Then, focusing on three alternative elections, we derive some analytical representations for the vulnerability of a large number of voting rules to strategic manipulation by considering successively each type of equilibrium. Our results show that the hierarchy of the rules changes when the voting framework is modified. However, some rules are clearly dominated and some others (among which the Borda and the Nanson rules) appear to be uniquely the best in some specific contexts. 相似文献
100.
Paul A. Toro Carolyn J. Tompsett Sylvie Lombardo Pierre Philippot Hilde Nachtergael Benoit Galand Natascha Schlienz Nadine Stammel Yanélia Yabar Marc Blume Linda MacKay Kate Harvey 《The Journal of social issues》2007,63(3):505-524
Random samples of 250–435 adults were interviewed by telephone in five different nations ( N = 1,546): Belgium, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the United States. The interview included questions on respondent attitudes, knowledge, and opinions regarding homelessness; respondents' own personal experiences with homelessness and homeless people; and demographic characteristics of the respondents. The highest rates for lifetime literal homelessness were found in the UK (7.7%) and United States (6.2%), with the lowest rate in Germany (2.4%), and intermediate rates in Italy (4.0%) and Belgium (3.4%). Less compassionate attitudes toward the homeless were also found on many dimensions in the United States and the UK. Possible explanations of these findings, drawn from various theoretical perspectives, and policy implications are provided . 相似文献