Neighborhood naming as an index of attachment to place

One aspect of attachment to place may relate to neighborhood naming. That is, recent investigations have found that in many communities large numbers of residents can supply locality labels. The most recent studies, however, have failed to confirm the importance of local social involvement as a predictor of naming. Following the earlier suggestion of Shumaker and Taylor (1983) that attachment dynamics can operate at the group level, we focus on small, local groups by analyzing street blocks. Results support our hypothesis that groups with more shared local ties are more able to supply a neighborhood name. This relationship was also obtained when we examined purely individual-level covariation. Results underscore the multilevel nature of attachment processes and how they are both social and psychological in nature. Links between cognitive and affective components of attachment and practical outcomes such as local problem solving are discussed.     

Radon Risk Information and Voluntary Protection: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

This study examines the perceived risks and mitigating behavior of Maine households who received new information on their exposures to significant health risks from indoor radon. The observed responses of these households illustrate conceptual issues related to designing an effective risk information program. Despite the involvement of generally well-motivated homeowners and well-intentioned researchers and government officials, we conclude that the risk information approach used in Maine failed to induce appropriate, cost-effective voluntary protection. The results indicate that, after receiving radon test results, information on associated health risks, and suggestions on how to reduce exposures: perceived risks tended to understate objective risks by orders of magnitude, and there was no statistically significant relationship between mitigating behavior and objective risks. These results suggest that the formation of risk perceptions and subsequent behavioral adjustments involve complex interactions among information, contextual, socioeconomic, and psychological variables. Therefore, government programs that seek to reduce health and safety risks with information programs, instead of using more conventional enforced standards, must be crafted very carefully to accommodate this complex process.     

Improving Risk Communication

This paper explores reasons for difficulties in communicating risks among analysts, the laypublic, media, and regulators. Formulating risk communication problems as decisions involving objectives and alternatives helps to identify strategies for overcoming these difficulties. Several strategies are suggested to achieve risk communication objectives like improving public knowledge about risks and risk management, encouraging risk reduction behavior, understanding public values and concerns, and increasing trust and credibility.     

Does the Vertical Mosaic Still Exist? Ethnicity and Income in Canada, 1991*

Cet article met à jour nos connaissances sur les liens entre appartenance ethnique et classe sociale au Canada en s'appuyant sur le document The Public Use Microdata File for Individuals, qui se fonde sur le recensement du Canada de 1991. L'analyse se fait en trois temps: on examine d'abord les liens entre l'appartenance ethnique et le niveau d'etudes par groupe ethnique; on considère ensuite les revenus en fonction du niveau d'études chez différents groupes ethniques; enfin, à l'aide de l'analyse de régression log-linéaire, on étudie les liens entre appartenance ethnique, niveau d'études et revenu en neutralisant les effets de nombreuses autres variables sociales. On constate que, dans la plupart des catégories de niveau d'études, les Canadiens-Français ont des revenus beaucoup plus élevés que les Canadiens-Anglais, lorsqu'on neutralise les effets d'autres variables. À cette exception près, il n'y a presque aucune différence de revenus entre les différentes ethnies d'origine européenne possédant le même niveau d'études lorsqu'on neutralise les effets d'autres variables sociales. Toutefois, ceux qui appartiennent à des minorités visibles ont des revenus beaucoup plus modestes que les autres Canadiens, quel que soit leur niveau d'études. L'origine raciale est done devenue la principale cause d'inégalités de revenus au Canada. This paper updates our knowledge about the relationship between ethnicity and social class in Canada using The Public Use Microdata File for Individuals drawn from the 1991 Census of Canada. We provide three levels of analysis. First, we examine the relationship between ethnicity and education by ethnic group. Second, we examine the “return to education” in terms of income for those of various ethnic groups. Third, we use log-linear regression to examine the relationship between ethnicity, education and income while controlling for the effects of a variety of other social variables. We find that, at most educational levels, Canadians of French ethnicity now earn significantly more than those of British ethnicity when other variables are controlled. With this exception, for those of European ethnic backgrounds there are now virtually no significant differences in income within educational levels when other social variables are controlled. However, those who belong to visible minorities have significantly lower incomes than other Canadians at all educational levels. Race is now the fundamental basis of income inequality in Canada.     

State making and state terror

Conclusion The interesting question, therefore, is this: why have we seldom heard about the destabilizing consequences of Central government policy in the pre-1949 Chinese countryside? Surely one reason has to do with the fact that the well-known models put forth by Western historians to comprehend modern Chinese history and politics by and large left out the interest of the Central government. Up until the time Theda Skocpol published States and Social Revolutions there were, generally speaking, three such models. In the first of these models, the Central government was said to have been a state blown apart by military separatism. Advocates of a second model acknowledged that Chiang Kai-shek led the Central government to defeat most of the aristocratic warlord armies of the 1927–30 period, but nonetheless portrayed the center as lacking the bureaucratic machinery necessary to penetrate the vast rural interior and halt the devolution of state power. According to Philip Kuhn, William Wei, and Philip C. C. Huang, this devolutionary process played into the hands of entrenched local elites who were against state building, or who, as Prasenjit Duara has brilliantly shown, acted as brokers to alter Central government claims in order to serve their own interests. Yet a third model was sketched out in the insightful historical studies of Lloyd E. Eastman. According to Eastman, the Republican center was real enough, but the plans of its policymakers to create economic wealth and expand their controls over rural society were confounded by factional infighting and cut short by the Japanese invasion of China in 1937.To be sure, each of the preceding models has enriched our understanding of the relation of the Republican polity to rural society within a given time frame and in a given place. William Wei's study, which shows that Chiang Kai-shek's Central government was more or less compelled to compromise with local strongmen in order to pacify Jiangxi province in the mid-1930s, is but one convincing example of the warlord devolution of state power thesis. Thus Wei strikes a familiar Skocpolian note — that of a Republican state permeated by rival social interests — when he concludes that the inescapable irony of it all was that by restoring the rural elite to power, the Guomindang had actually undermined its long-sought goal of placing the countryside fully under Central government control.By way of contrast, the formation of collective protest among the peasant salt producers of North China cannot be explained by merely evoking one of the well-established models of the Republican polity. That the Central government and its political interest is missing in most scholarly accounts of the coming of the Chinese Revolution is not surprising, for as Bruce Cumings wisely has pointed out, scholars of agrarian political systems have not developed a sufficient understanding of what prompts rural people to rebel largely because they seldom know what the politics of particular state structures are. I suspect that the precepts of the past, in combination with the current preoccupations with social history, have blinded us to the larger questions about the Republican state and its role in inciting rural disorder. Yet by following Tilly, and by exploring the macrohistory of the Republican state, we can see that there was a Central government, and that Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Song, H. H. Kong, and other state makers made up the core of a ruling national clique bent on developing a political economy that would serve its own political interest. Having grasped this piece of the puzzle, we are in a better position to comprehend the political origins of collective protest in the countryside. Clearly, the Chiang Kai-shek center did have a major interest in salt revenue, and just as clearly the grievances and gatherings of the country people were linked to the revenue demands of the reconditioned gabelle. The emergence of popular collective action thus can be explained by the fact that China's country people could not adapt their lives to the Central government attempt to establish a political economy based on state monopoly and state-organized violence.Clearly, also, the Central government under Chiang Kai-shek did attempt to build its own state apparatus - its army, police forces, and bureaucracy — by developing new sources of revenue. By detailing the Republican state interest in taxing, or taking over, trade in rural products such as timber, salt, and coal we can begin to explore the process whereby the center reached deep into the countryside, and thereby advance our understanding of the progress made by the state in imposing its claims in the face of competition from provincial warlord regimes, county level actors, and village society. Few if any of the authors of the well-established models of the Republican polity have in fact looked systematically at the Central government quest for one specific type of revenue, or traced the development and extension of state revenue machinery within a given region, province, or county - let alone a village - over the long duree of modern Chinese history. My challenge to Skocpol, and the literature upon which her thesis is based, rests on just such a research strategy, that is, on evidence that the Central government was expanding its control over salt trade and over revenue from salt taxes in the North China interior during the Nationalist decade, 1927–37. By surveying the politics of salt, we have seen that the Central government Ministry of Finance was making some measure of progress in overcoming warlord controls, overriding the objections of local elites, and obliterating the structures of everyday peasant resistance.What does all of this suggest about the weakness of the Nanjing Central government? When Central government fiscal policy is placed firmly in the context of evolving state power, the Chiang Kai-shek center appears less anemic than is usually assumed - at least in this one issue area. To make this case, we need not deny that a condition of multiple sovereignty persisted in Republican China, or that Chiang Kaishek's Republic was not fully effective in its attempted expansion. But neither should we neglect the fact that the Chiang Kai-shek center was attempting to build a state in China, and that its state strengthening policies misfired and triggered collective protest. Such ill-conceived policies, along with the popular resistance to police efforts to enforce them, combined to place a major constraint on the state-building experiment.Thus, the fiscal claims of the Republican Central government itself combined with microlevel factors to produce this particular episode of collective protest. Gabelle-based income was one of the main pillars of Central government revenue from Yuan Shikai to Chiang Kai-shek. The center's attempt to transform China's long-established system of salt tax collection into a big profitable business was of course undertaken to pay off war indemnities and foreign debts and to underwrite state development. The problem was that progress in this sphere came at the expense of thousands upon thousands of village dwellers who shared an interest in the old earth salt economies of inland China. Understandably, the revved-up revenue collection machinery of the Central government's Salt Bureau - specifically the efforts of its tax police to seize the earth salt produced in peasant villages, which historically had been opposed to the official monopoly - drew the country people into confrontations and clashes with the agents of the state. Hence at the heart of this little known story is the resistance of China's salt land villages to a system of bureaucratic police controls supportive of the expansion of central state power. Of course for a more searchingly nuanced and complex explanation, we could factor in warlord politics, local elite inputs, and the factional intrigues of the Chiang Kaishek clique, but the important point is that the problem facing the country people was systemic, that is, the state-making process itself.Finally, the spirit of this episode of collective protest was not anti-capitalist. Rather, China's country people turned to collective action in order to preserve their longstanding rights to produce for the free market. The struggles of the peasant salt makers thus underscore the prevalence of the deeply structured market forces of which G. William Skinner has written, and remind us that rural protest sometimes took the form of a broad popular statement against state market controls. At the lower rungs of the rural marketing hierarchy, the peasant salt producers joined other pro-market groups, including local merchants and lower gentry, to prevent the Central government police from subordinating their communities to the state drive for revenue. Whether the Republican state was on the verge of winning this war on the popular market before World War II remains to be seen. But one point is clear: Central government interference in the popular market prerogatives produced a cast of angry characters who gained experience in organizing collective actions that transcended village politics, and their actions attracted the attention of Chinese Communist Party cadres who also were suffering from the repression of the protostate.     

A Comparison of Methods of Benchmark-Dose Estimation for Continuous Response Data

Methods of quantitative risk assessment for toxic responses that are measured on a continuous scale are not well established. Although risk-assessment procedures that attempt to utilize the quantitative information in such data have been proposed, there is no general agreement that these procedures are appreciably more efficient than common quantal dose–response procedures that operate on dichotomized continuous data. This paper points out an equivalence between the dose–response models of the nonquantal approach of Kodell and West⁽¹⁾ and a quantal probit procedure, and provides results from a Monte Carlo simulation study to compare coverage probabilities of statistical lower confidence limits on dose corresponding to specified additional risk based on applying the two procedures to continuous data from a dose–response experiment. The nonquantal approach is shown to be superior, in terms of both statistical validity and statistical efficiency.     

European Communication Monitor 2009. An institutionalized view of how public relations and communication management professionals face the economic and media crises in Europe

The European Communication Monitor (ECM) is an extensive longitudinal research project to monitor trends in public relations and communication management and analyze the changing framework for the profession in Europe. The 2009 ECM edition identifies the main characteristics of individual practitioners and the organizations where they work. The aim is to monitor the challenges for communication management in the recession and media crisis; the development of the sub disciplines, instruments and strategic issues; and the influence on management decisions. Additionally ECM 2009 evaluates three specific areas: internal communication, research in communication and interactive communication.     

The Role of Knowledge in Resource Allocation to Exploration versus Exploitation in Technologically Oriented Organizations*

Decisions regarding research and development (R&D) activities of an organization greatly affect the fiscal and market outcomes of technologically oriented firms. Yet, the resource allocation choices between these two activities are tied strongly to an organization's technology knowledge. Technological knowledge is itself a resource that the firm can manage to achieve strategic and competitive advantage. In this paper, the authors present a system dynamics view of the decomposition of R&D efforts into explorative and exploitive activities and the resultant knowledge‐specific and performance outcomes from the decision to focus on one type of activity or another. Four factors are shown to affect the relative value of innovative knowledge to the organization: resource availability, exogenous competition, aging of knowledge bases, and adaptive capacity, a firm's ability to adapt to its environment. A variety of long‐ and short‐term strategic issues are discussed in relation to these forces.