Near‐Misses and Future Disaster Preparedness

Disasters garner attention when they occur, and organizations commonly extract valuable lessons from visible failures, adopting new behaviors in response. For example, the United States saw numerous security policy changes following the September 11 terrorist attacks and emergency management and shelter policy changes following Hurricane Katrina. But what about those events that occur that fall short of disaster? Research that examines prior hazard experience shows that this experience can be a mixed blessing. Prior experience can stimulate protective measures, but sometimes prior experience can deceive people into feeling an unwarranted sense of safety. This research focuses on how people interpret near‐miss experiences. We demonstrate that when near‐misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur and thus provide the perception that the system is resilient to the hazard, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions. On the other hand, if near‐misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened and thus provide the perception that the system is vulnerable to the hazard, this will counter the basic “near‐miss” effect and encourage mitigation. In this article, we use these distinctions between resilient and vulnerable near‐misses to examine how people come to define an event as either a resilient or vulnerable near‐miss, as well as how this interpretation influences their perceptions of risk and their future preparedness behavior. Our contribution is in highlighting the critical role that people's interpretation of the prior experience has on their subsequent behavior and in measuring what shapes this interpretation.     

Successful innovation through inter-company networks

Companies are now investing in the new technologies of the 1990s. This article deals with the central question of why and how companies work together on technological innovation. First the author looks at the reality of technological innovation, and review reasons why companies might want to work together in this area. They then uncover the different types of collaboration involved in technological innovation. These forms are innovation networks, and they identify several success factors for innovation networks.     

Network Evening News Coverage of Environmental Risk

ABC, CBS, and NBC's carefully crafted and expensively produced evening news broadcasts devoted 1.7% of their air time to 564 stories about man-made environmental risks during the period from January 1984 to February 1986. Little relationship was found between amount of coverage and public health risk. Instead, the networks appeared to be using traditional journalistic determinants of news (timeliness, proximity, prominence, consequence, and human interest) plus the broadcast criterion of visual impact to determine the degree of coverage of risk issues. Government, industry, and citizens accounted for two-thirds of the sources cited by the networks. Experts and spokespersons for environmental advocacy groups were sparsely used as sources. Given the media's need for news pegs, acute and chronic risk stories were covered differently. Acute risk stories were reported in a clearly defined cycle, peaking on the second day with on-the-scene reports and film-clips of devastation. In keeping with a decrease in visual drama, later reports were shorter and emphasized legal and political considerations. Chronic risk coverage followed the release of new scientific, legal, or political information.     

Risk return approach to product portfolio strategy

This article describes how a risk-return portfolio analysis, as originally developed in economics and finance, can be applied to product-line decisions. This approach uses direct estimates of return, and explicitly considers risk, or variation in return; most of the product portfolio models in use today forecast return by correlation, and lack explicit treatment of risk. The approach provides guidance for new product development activities as well as for allocating resources among a corporation's existing product lines. The article explains how organizations can apply this approach to their own product portfolio decisions, and includes a detailed example of how one company used this model.     

Whatever happened to environmental analysis?

This article discusses a longitudinal study of firms selected for their expertise in environmental analysis. It is primarily designed to test two general propositions. The first, that environmental analysis is increasing in importance over time— both within and between firms; and the second, that environmental analysis is most viable as a separate, freestanding function within the organization.     

Final report of the Color Additive Scientific Review Panel

The Color Additives Scientific Review Panel considered whether there was information sufficient to perform a carcinogenic risk assessment on the colors D&C Red No. 19 (R-19), D&C Red No. 37 (R-37), D&C Orange No. 17 (O-17), D&C Red No. 9 (R-9), D&C Red No. 8 (R-8) and FD&C Red No. 3 (R-3) and to evaluate the assessments sent to FDA as part of the petitions for use of the colors for drug and external uses by the Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association (CTFA). There is a lack of human data concerning the colors for making a human health assessment, so the assessments are based upon the extrapolation of animal data. The risk assessments are determined for exposure to single chemicals. Excluded from consideration are possible effects from exposure to multiple chemicals, such as co-carcinogenesis, promotion, synergism, antagonism, etc. In the light of recent efforts in establishing a consensus in risk assessment, the Panel has determined that the CTFA assessments for R-10, O-17, and R-9 are consistent with present acceptable usages, although it questions some of the assumptions used in the assessments. The Panel identified a number of general assumptions made, and discusses their validity, their impact on total uncertainty, and the potential options to address the gaps in understanding that necessitate the assumption. The Panel also derived revised risk estimates using more "reasonable" assumptions than "worst-case" situations, for 90th percentile and average exposure. For those assumptions that are easily quantifiable, the Panel's estimates are less than an order of magnitude lower than the CTFA risk estimates, indicating that the underestimates and overestimates of the CTFA risk estimates tend to balance each other. The impact of most of the assumptions is not quantifiable. The assessment for R-3 is complicated by the fact that there is no good skin penetrance study for this color. It was assumed that the penetrance is similar to that of another water-soluble xanthene color, R-19. It is expected that the absorption of the color is not likely to exceed that of the smaller molecule, R-19. Therefore, the risk estimates are similar to the CTFA estimates, but with different reasoning. The estimates for R-8 and R-37 are different from the others in that there is a lack of any exposure or toxicological information on these colors.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Comparing Expressed and Revealed Preferences for Risk Reduction: Different Hazards and Question Frames

Studies often note the wide differences that exist in costs per death avoided across U.S. federal programs and regulatory contexts. This paper explores two new, related explanations for these differences. First, it argues that the patterns of revealed preferences (public allocations) may be related to public values, which are measured here through subjects' expressed preference responses to a contingent valuation survey regarding risk reduction. Subjects' expressed values are compared to actual (and proposed) costs of safety regulations for a similar set of hazards. We discover strong congruence in the ranking of expressed values and actual values. Second, the paper presents the results of a subsequent survey that investigates why the patterns observed in the first survey might occur. It suggests that one reason for the observed similarities between revealed and expressed preferences may be in how choices are framed. The paper hypothesizes that both subjects and decision makers may frame valuation decisions in the same way: as percentage changes from the reference point provided by the base rate of deaths for that hazard.     

U.K. competition policy evaluated

This paper surveys the application of U.K. monopoly policy and examines its general impact on industrial structure and market processes. It considers the effects of the Competition Act 1980 in relation to U.K. monopoly control and concludes that unless further measures are introduced, competitive pressures are likely to be weakened over the longer term.