A Model of Migrants' Remittances with Human Capital Investment and Intrafimilial Transfers1

This study analyzes data on migrants' remittances using a two‐period theory of intergenerational transfers based on an informal, intrafamilial loan arrangement using “weak altruism,” a behavior between “strong altruism” and pure self‐interest. The model provides an integrated theory of migrants' remittances, human capital investment decisions, and intrafamilial transfers applicable to low‐income countries with no official pension schemes and imperfect capital markets. Propositions, derived from the theory, are tested, re‐analyzing original survey data on remittances of Pacific island migrants in Sydney. When weak altruism and strong altruism yield opposite predictions, the econometric results tend to confirm the former hypothesis and invalidate the latter.     

Organizational Change and the Importance of Embedded Assumptions*

‘Managing change’ appears a simple enough term. However, no common ontological assumption underlies either the notion of ‘managing’ or that of ‘change’. In this paper, we identify different assumptions about both what it means to manage and the nature of change outcomes. From these assumptions we derive six different images of managing organizational change: directing, navigating, caretaking, coaching, interpreting and nurturing. We show how each image is underpinned by different organization theories. We then take each image and show how the differing ontological assumptions about managing and change outcomes are associated with different research agendas. We illustrate this by focusing on three elements commonly associated with managing organizational change: vision, communication and resistance.     

Bayesian utilitarianism and probability homogeneity

This paper investigates, within the axiomatic framework of Jeffrey-Bolker decision theory, two kinds of conditions and the relation between them: (1) The Utilitarian condition that social rankings of prospects be representable by an expected utility function that is a weighted sum of the expected utility functions representing individual rankings; and (2) Homogeneity conditions on the probabilities and preferences of individuals. In particular, we show that identity of individuals’ probabilities is necessary and sufficient for the Utilitarian condition to hold and that the homogeneity of individuals’ probabilities can be derived from a Pareto condition on the relation between individual and social rankings, provided that these rankings are separable in a particular sense.This paper has considerably benefited from comments by John Broome, Isaac Levi and an anonymous referee. Special thanks to Philippe Mongin who provided encouragement, help and careful criticism throughout the development of this paper.