MONEY DEMAND DURING HYPERINFLATION AND STABILIZATION: BOLIVIA, 1980–1988

This paper examines the demand for money in Bolivia during the 1980s, a decade of extreme instability with annual inflation rates reaching over 20,000 percent, and a subsequent stabilization, with annual rates falling to less than 25 percent and remaining so for more than five years.
Our empirical analysis makes use of error-correction approaches, time-varying-parameter estimation with Kalman filtering, and GARCH models of expected inflation and inflation variance. We find that expected inflation and inflation uncertainty both matter for money demand. Time-varying estimates show that the reaction to monetary disequilibria was significantly faster during hyperinflation.     

TESTING SPHERICITY UNDER A MIXTURE MODEL

The robustness of Mauchly's sphericity test criterion when sampling from a mixture of two multivariate normal distributions is studied. The distribution of the sphericity test criterion when the sample covariance matrix has a non-central Wishart density of rank one is derived in terms of Meijer's G-functions; its distribution under the mixture model is then deduced. The robustness is studied by computing actual significance levels of the test under the mixture model using the critical values under the usual normal model.     

Will taxpayers ever like taxes?: Responses to the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986

Major policy changes like the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) in the United States provide natural experiments to study attitudinal and behavior responses to law. Surprisingly, public evaluations of the TRA became increasingly negative after passage, while general support for the tax system became more positive in response to the changes. To explain this puzzle, we propose a dynamic model of taxpayer attitudes that is consistent with the observed loose linkage between logically-connected concepts. We briefly review the political context, objectives and impacts of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, and present several studies testing the impact of self-interest, prior beliefs, and social discussion on changes in attitudes and behavior.Results suggest that the complexity of taxes and difficulty in knowing objective impacts weakens the role of self-interest in attitudinal changes, thereby strengthening the role of prior beliefs and discussion. Evaluations of tax laws are most responsive to more politically-oriented influences.     

“WHAT DOES SHE SEE IN HIM?”: THE EFFECT OF SHARING ON THE CHOICE OF SPOUSE

All husbands and wives share in the spoils of marriage. Sharing makes each partner a residual claimant and encourages spouses to provide marital inputs. However, because each spouse is only a partial residual claimant, each may be inclined to provide a "suboptimal" level of marital inputs. The choice of spouse influences the level of distortion, and under some circumstances the efficient mating is between individuals of equal value     

Maintaining the connection: Parenting as a noncustodial father

The purpose of this study was to identify relevant factors associated with the noncustodial father's frequency of contact with his child following divorce. The findings of the research revealed that a combination of demographic, personal characteristics, and psychosocial factors are related to the father's frequency of contact with the child.     

Agency costs,property rights,and the evolution of labor unions

Collective bargaining requires that an agent represent workers. This paper examines the implications for the trade union movement of the resulting agency costs. Without transferable rights in the union, union members lack the means and incentive to bring forth the innovative agent controls common to the modern corporation. Considerations of the bargaining strengths of employers and employees, each represented by an agent, provide an explanation of the simultaneous decline of private sector union membership (corporate share holders have been more successful at lowering agency costs) and growth of public sector union representation (where the union official, a “double agent,” serves the interest of both employee and bureaucratic employer). The authors acknowledge the helpful remarks Donald L. Martin whose earlier research on property rights in unions inspired this effort. Don Bellante’s work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.