Toward an emergent Asian behavioural model of perceived managerial and leadership effectiveness: a cross-nation comparative analysis of effective and ineffective managerial behaviour of private sector managers in India and South Korea

ABSTRACT

This Type 4 (emic-and-etic) indigenous cross-case/cross-nation comparative study compares the results of two Type 3 (emic-as-emic) indigenous replication studies of effective and ineffective managerial behaviour carried out within private companies in India and South Korea respectively. The method used was ‘realist qualitative content analysis’ involving inductive open and axial coding. Of the Indian findings 100% were found to be convergent in meaning with 94.43% of the equivalent South Korean findings. This has led to the identification of a two-factor emergent Asian behavioural model of perceived managerial and leadership effectiveness comprised of 16 positive (effective) and 6 negative (ineffective) generic behavioural criteria. These criteria could be used in both countries to critically review and improve extant, or develop new, competency-based management/leadership development programmes. The research findings lend no support to claims that national culture has a major impact on managerial and leadership practices, styles, and effectiveness.     

Debiasing or regularisation? Two interpretations of the concept of ‘true preference’ in behavioural economics

Theory and Decision - I reconsider Bleichrodt, Pinto Prades and Wakker’s (BPW) 2001 paper about eliciting utility measures from stated preference surveys. That paper pioneers a method that is...     

A Shiny Update to an Old Experiment Game

ABSTRACT

Games can be a powerful tool for learning about statistical methodology. Effective game design involves a fine balance between caricature and realism, to simultaneously illustrate salient concepts in a controlled setting and serve as a testament to real-world applicability. Striking that balance is particularly challenging in response surface and design domains, where real-world scenarios often play out over long time scales, during which theories are revised, model and inferential techniques are improved, and knowledge is updated. Here, I present a game, borrowing liberally from one first played over 40 years ago, which attempts to achieve that balance while reinforcing a cascade of topics in modern nonparametric response surfaces, sequential design, and optimization. The game embeds a blackbox simulation within a shiny app whose interface is designed to simulate a realistic information–availability setting, while offering a stimulating, competitive environment wherein students can try out new methodology, and ultimately appreciate its power and limitations. Interface, rules, timing with course material, and evaluation are described, along with a “case study” involving a cohort of students at Virginia Tech. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.     

Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations

We consider a normal-form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. The actions representing other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the sovereign, individual control of the players. We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are stated and we identify conditions under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent. We apply this framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly, typically, a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium. The paradox vanishes if the cartel attains a leadership position. For international pollution abatement treaties, cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.     

Lightning Rods in the Local Moral Economy: Debating Unauthorized Migrants' Deservingness in Israel

Localized debates about who unauthorized migrants are and what they do, or do not, deserve unfold in a culturally specific register that is deeply charged with emotion and moral valuation. Structuring such debates are vernacular discursive frames that emerge from, and reflect, a common “local moral economy.” Taking Israel as case study, this article examines six elements of the country's local moral economy – biopolitical logic, historical memory, political emotion, popularized religion, an ideology of “fruitful multiplication,” and hasbara (“public diplomacy”/propaganda) – and explores their impact on public debates about unauthorized and irregular forms of migration. Here, as elsewhere, conventionalized distinctions that frame much migration scholarship – e.g. “economic” vs. “political” migrants, “migrant workers” vs. “refugees,” even the terms “authorized” and “unauthorized” themselves – bear but limited salience. Migration researchers who hope to influence local policy debates must recognize the weight and influence of local moral economies, and the chasms that divide vernacular from conventionalized frames. Achieving this sort of nuanced understanding is, at root, an ethnographic challenge.