The economists and the primitive societies: A critique of economic imperialism

The extension of economics to topics that lie outside its classical domain is known as ‘economic imperialism’. But there are territories of social science that persist to be largely intractable using the postulates of economic theory: the anthropological subject of primitive societies represents one such territory. This paper describes and discusses the representation of primitive societies by economists from the proto-imperialist model of Smith to the imperialist Posner's model. It maintains that (a) the economists’ attempt at interpretation is highly unsatisfactory and (b) it is possible to offer a different representation of the primitive societies, one more coherent with the anthropological and ethnographical data, and able to show the inadequacy and insubstantiality of many economic categories when applied to those societies.     

The development of global IT infrastructure

A research model of the impact of a multinational corporations’ (MNC) global strategic orientation on global IT infrastructure was developed using global integration, or the degree to which a global strategy is actually implemented, as a mediator. A “matched pair” survey of 94 MNCs was conducted (two respondents per firm) in order to guard against common source bias. The results showed that the firms that pursue a globally oriented strategy actually enacted these strategies as indicated by a wide-variety of resource flows across national units. The role of the level of global integration as a mediator between global strategic orientation and global IT capabilities was empirically demonstrated. This confirms that a global strategy is not sufficient to ensure that an enabling IT infrastructure will be developed; rather it is the actual level of integration and interdependence that is achieved as a result of the strategy that drives IT infrastructure. The primary areas in which global integration was found to be closely linked to the global IT infrastructure were human resources, which significantly influenced the reach, range, support services and planning of the global IT infrastructure, and information resources which significantly influenced the planning dimension of the infrastructure. These results strongly suggest that the transfer of people among national units creates an information needs “pull” which leads to the development of better IT infrastructure and that the “push” of standardized information also contributes positively.     

The effects of board size and ‘busy’ directors on the market value of Italian companies

This paper presents evidence that corporate governance quality measured by (1) the board size and (2) the fraction of directors that serve on more corporate boards, influences the market value of firms. The analysis is based in Italy, a country that is characterized by family and concentrated ownership, low legal protection of investors and pyramidal firm structures. Our empirical results suggest that the level of ‘busy-ness’ of corporate directors as a measure of board effectiveness has a significant influence on firm’s market performance. By contrast, we find limited evidence that board size has a substantial impact on the market valuation, except in small and medium enterprises and in some specific industry sectors.

Theorizing the relationship between inequality and economic growth

This article explores a promising theoretical approach for reassessing the relationship between inequality and economic growth. The article draws some insights from the influential inverted U-curve hypothesis originally advanced by Simon Kuznets, but drastically recasts the original arguments by shifting two fundamental premises. First, retaining Kuznets’s emphasis on the importance of economic growth in generating demographic transitions between existing and new distributional arrays, we argue that a “constant drive toward inequality” results after replacing a Schumpeterian notion of “creative destruction” for the dualistic assumptions in Kuznets’s model. Second, while Kuznets devoted considerable attention to the impact of institutions on distributional outcomes, we argue that institutions should be understood as relational and global mechanisms of regulation, operating within countries while simultaneously shaping interactions and flows between nations. The article argues that economic growth, unfolding through institutions embedded in time and space, produces a constant drive towards inequality that results in a multiple and overlapping matrix of distributional arrays, an overall income distribution (e.g., within and between countries) that is both systemic and historical.     

Darwinist connections between the systemness of social organizations and their evolution

Is the systemness of social organizations related to their evolution? This research question has not yet received appropriate attention by the literature on management and organization theory. The author believes that addressing it can constitute a substantive opportunity to understand key intertwined associated processes, such as organizational survival, competitive success/advantage, or failure. In this article, the author attempts to contribute to fill the aforesaid gap adopting a critical Darwinist approach.     

Engineer-to-order (ETO) production planning and control: an empirical framework for machinery-building companies

This paper illustrates the results of an empirical study involving 21 engineer-to-order (ETO) companies, operating in the machinery-building industry. The study investigates the needs and requirements of such companies in terms of software support for governing the businesses, with particular emphasis on production planning and control (PPC) processes. An empirical analysis investigated two main aspects: (i) the set of business activities performed by the companies in the analysed industry and (ii) the relevant, high-level software functionalities required for the execution of such activities. As an answer to the observed compelling need for reviewing the general approaches to PPC in machinery-building companies, we develop an empirical, high-level production planning and scheduling reference framework, encompassing all the activities involved in the order fulfilment process.     

MARKET POWER AND INFORMATION REVELATION IN DYNAMIC TRADING

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the world. When n = 1, full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. With n > 1 the outcome depends both on the structure of the sellers' information and, even more importantly, on the intensity of competition allowed by the existing trading rules. When there is intense competition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough, regardless of the number of informed sellers. On the other hand, for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms of competition (presence of clienteles), for any n we always have equilibria where information is never fully revealed. Moreover, in that case, when only one seller is informed, for many parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation, even for large n. (JEL: C72, C78, D82, D83)