How are employees of the nonprofit sector motivated? A research need

This article reviews research on motivation of employees in the nonprofit sector, with a major emphasis on the motivation of teachers and hospital nursing staff. Although both areas are widely researched in the nonprofit sector, empirical motivation research conducted in schools and hospitals is certainly not extensive. Nevertheless, based on these limited research findings, we derive potential hypotheses for future research in schools and hospitals.     

Agency conflicts between board and manager

Detecting agency problems is an important task when assessing the effectiveness of a nonprofit organization's governance. A first step is to examine the objectives of principals and agents and determine whether there is a systematic difference between them. Using a discrete choice experiment, we identify the objectives of board chairpersons (principals) and headmasters (agents) of Flemish nonprofit schools. We find systematic differences between the two groups. Of the seven possible objectives set out in the experiment, six are relevant for both headmasters and board chairpersons. For four of these, the preferences of both groups differ significantly. Whereas ideological values play an important role for both the board and the headmaster, they are significantly more important for the board. Both parties dislike having a large number of pupils, and the disutility is larger for the board. With respect to job satisfaction and pupil satisfaction, we find the opposite: while the board is prepared to give up pupil and job satisfaction in favor of the other objectives, these two objectives score very high on the priority list of the headmasters.     

Expertise-based lobbying and accounting regulation

It has long been recognised that accounting regulation is not a mere technical exercise but one that takes place in a political context and lobbying has been examined in numerous empirical studies. Most of these studies address lobbying of the accounting standard setter. However, standard setting is embedded in a political and institutional context. In their decision-making, these institutions depend on the expertise of potentially self-interested lobbyists. This expertise-provision element tends to be ignored in most lobbying studies. The present paper proposes an analytical model of lobbying of an accounting regulator that explicitly focuses on the provision of relevant information by lobbyists. It suggests that lobbying will generally be non-controversial, i.e. either those opposed to a standard will lobby or those favouring it, but not both. Analysis of the model furthermore implies an important role for the regulator’s ex ante leanings, both perceived and real, even when the regulator treats all information received impartially. This implies an important role for the institutional context of accounting regulation.     

Principal‐agent relationships on the stewardship‐agency axis

This article provides an overview of the literature on nonprofit principal‐agent relationships. It depicts the nature of agency theory and stewardship theory, analyzes the origin of their struggle within the nonprofit structure, and marks directions for a conciliatory approach. We open with an introduction to agency theory and discuss the two main components of its mathematical branch. We thereby contrast it with stewardship theory and elaborate on the arguments that can affect the position of nonprofit principal‐agent relationships on the stewardship‐agency axis. Analysis of the existing literature points to a lack of consensus as to which theory should be applied. We argue that the division of nonprofit principalagent relationships into board‐manager and manageremployee interactions may help to clarify the balance between agency theory and stewardship theory and may lead to the establishment of a strongly founded theory on nonprofit principal‐agent relationships. We close with a discussion of how this article may prove valuable to nonprofit policymakers and other empirical researchers.     

Risks of Paralytic Disease Due to Wild or Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus After Eradication

After the global eradication of wild polioviruses, the risk of paralytic poliomyelitis from polioviruses will still exist and require active management. Possible reintroductions of poliovirus that can spread rapidly in unprotected populations present challenges to policymakers. For example, at least one outbreak will likely occur due to circulation of a neurovirulent vaccine-derived poliovirus after discontinuation of oral poliovirus vaccine and also could possibly result from the escape of poliovirus from a laboratory or vaccine production facility or from an intentional act. In addition, continued vaccination with oral poliovirus vaccines would result in the continued occurrence of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis. The likelihood and impacts of reintroductions in the form of poliomyelitis outbreaks depend on the policy decisions and on the size and characteristics of the vulnerable population, which change over time. A plan for managing these risks must begin with an attempt to characterize and quantify them as a function of time. This article attempts to comprehensively characterize the risks, synthesize the existing data available for modeling them, and present quantitative risk estimates that can provide a starting point for informing policy decisions.