Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat

We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a dollar, each player receives what he demanded; if the sum of demands is greater than a dollar, all players receive zero. We modify this second part, which involves a harsh punishment. In the modified game \((D\!D^{\prime })\) , if the demands are incompatible, then players have one more chance. In particular, they play an ultimatum game to avoid the excess. In the two-player version of this game, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which players demand (and receive) an equal share of the dollar. We also provide an \(n\) -player extension of our mechanism. Finally, the mechanism we propose eliminates not only all pure strategy equilibria involving unequal divisions of the dollar, but also all equilibria where players mix over different demands in the first stage.     

Estimating subjective probabilities

Subjective probabilities play a central role in many economic decisions and act as an immediate confound of inferences about behavior, unless controlled for. Several procedures to recover subjective probabilities have been proposed, but in order to recover the correct latent probability one must either construct elicitation mechanisms that control for risk aversion, or construct elicitation mechanisms which undertake “calibrating adjustments” to elicited reports. We illustrate how the joint estimation of risk attitudes and subjective probabilities can provide the calibration adjustments that theory calls for. We illustrate this approach using data from a controlled experiment with real monetary consequences to the subjects. This allows the observer to make inferences about the latent subjective probability, under virtually any well-specified model of choice under subjective risk, while still employing relatively simple elicitation mechanisms.     

Impacts of Rivalry on Types of Compensation – Competition vs. Co-operation between Multiple Agents under Technological Interdependencies

This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance evaluation and in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence of technological interdependencies when agents exhibit a social preference for rivalry. We find that the principal reacts to his agents’ competitive preferences through a reallocation of incentive intensity. As a consequence, depending on the underlying sort of technological interdependency, various differences in the weighting of performance measures compared to the case of purely selfish behavior arise and changes in the agents’ basic types of wage compensation can occur. We further show that the principal does not want both of his agents to behave equally competitively. Instead, he can only profit when the agents are asymmetrical. Then the principal wants the more productive agent to exhibit rivalry while the other ideally should behave completely selfishly.     

Lobbying bei der Rechnungslegungsstandardsetzung. Ein Literaturüberblick

Research into the impact of lobbying on accounting standard setting has a decades-old tradition in international accounting research. Due to the changes brought about by the European Union’s IAS regulation as well as the application of new research methods this research topic has recently gained renewed relevance. The present article surveys the empirical literature on lobbying the accounting standard setter in Anglo-Saxon countries, discusses the transferability of this literature’s results to the new situation in the European Union and offers a perspective on current research topics.     

Let us do the twist again

Krämer (Sankhy $\bar{\mathrm{a }}$ 42:130–131, 1980) posed the following problem: “Which are the $\mathbf{y}$ , given $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{V}$ , such that OLS and Gauss–Markov are equal?”. In other words, the problem aimed at identifying those vectors $\mathbf{y}$ for which the ordinary least squares (OLS) and Gauss–Markov estimates of the parameter vector $\varvec{\beta }$ coincide under the general Gauss–Markov model $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{X} \varvec{\beta } + \mathbf{u}$ . The problem was later called a “twist” to Kruskal’s Theorem, which provides conditions necessary and sufficient for the OLS and Gauss–Markov estimates of $\varvec{\beta }$ to be equal. The present paper focuses on a similar problem to the one posed by Krämer in the aforementioned paper. However, instead of the estimation of $\varvec{\beta }$ , we consider the estimation of the systematic part $\mathbf{X} \varvec{\beta }$ , which is a natural consequence of relaxing the assumption that $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{V}$ are of full (column) rank made by Krämer. Further results, dealing with the Euclidean distance between the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) and the ordinary least squares estimator (OLSE) of $\mathbf{X} \varvec{\beta }$ , as well as with an equality between BLUE and OLSE are also provided. The calculations are mostly based on a joint partitioned representation of a pair of orthogonal projectors.     

Transformed density rejection with inflection points

The acceptance-rejection algorithm is often used to sample from non-standard distributions. For this algorithm to be efficient, however, the user has to create a hat function that majorizes and closely matches the density of the distribution to be sampled from. There are many methods for automatically creating such hat functions, but these methods require that the user transforms the density so that she knows the exact location of the transformed density’s inflection points. In this paper, we propose an acceptance-rejection algorithm which obviates this need and can thus be used to sample from a larger class of distributions.     

Comparison of seven measures of sickness absence based on data from three counties in Sweden

The objective was to compare the applicability of and results provided by the two measures of sickness absence used most often within the Swedish social insurance administration (that is, unadjusted sick-leave rate and adjusted sick-leave rate) and five measures suggested by epidemiological researchers. Data consisted of four cross-sectional data sets of registry sick-leave data covering four separate years (1997-2000) in three counties. In total 454,000 persons qualified for sickness insurance and aged 20-64 years were included. The two measures used within the social insurance administration and three of the five measures suggested by epidemiological researchers revealed sex-related dissimilarities in absence patterns that indicated that women had more sickness absence than men. However, in marked contrast to those results, two of the epidemiologically based measures (i.e., length of sickness absence and duration of sickness absence) instead showed highly comparable rates of sick leave for men and women, and such information is seldom obtained, albeit definitely of importance, when trying to make a correct assessment of sickness absence. The measure of sickness absence that is used influences the findings and should therefore be chosen with care. Complementing the measures used in the social insurance administration by five measures suggested by epidemiological researchers provided a more informative and comprehensive picture of sickness absence in a population. Further investigations into the effect of using different measures is needed, as well as international consensus on what to call different measures.     

Assessment of Work Performance (AWP)--development of an instrument

Adequate work assessments are a matter of importance both for individuals and society [5,29,31,38,40,46,52]. However, there is a lack of adequate and reliable instruments for use in work rehabilitation [14,15,20,21,31,44]. The purpose of this study was to develop and evaluate an observation instrument for assessing work performance, the AWP (Assessment of Work Performance). The purpose of the 14-item instrument is to assess the individual's observable working skills in three different areas: motor skills, process skills, and communication and interaction skills. This article describes the development and results of preliminary testing of the AWP. The testing indicates a satisfactory face validity and utility for the AWP and supports further research and testing of the instrument.