Book review

W.G.Cochran: Sampling Techniques, 3rd. Ed. John Wiley & Sons, New York-Santa Barbara-London-Sydney-Toronto 1977. 428 S., £ 12.50; $21.50.

H.Toutenburg: Vorhersage in linearen Modellen. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1975, VIII, 176b S., 3 Tab., 28,– M.

O.Kallenberg: Random Measure. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1975; Academic Press, London 1976. 104 pp., 28,– M.     

Contingencies versus External Pressure: Professionalization in Boards of Firms Affiliated to Family Business Groups in Late‐Industrializing Countries

We examine the antecedents of professionalization in boards of firms affiliated to family business groups, increasingly recognized in the literature as the dominant form of big business organization in many late‐industrializing countries. Dimensions of board professionalization that we include in our study are board size, ratio of salaried executives and outsider presence. We compare predictions on board composition derived from contingency, institutional and power perspectives. Turkish family business groups, considered as an archetypal example of this form of organization, provide the empirical setting for the study, with data on 299 firms affiliated to ten different family business groups. Our results provide greater support for institutional and power perspectives, showing that, relative to internal and external complexity facing affiliate firms, institutional pressures and the presence of joint venture partners better predict board professionalization.     

Population monotonic path schemes for simple games

A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand. Obviously, each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the Shapley allocation scheme of the game is population monotonic in the sense of Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We prove that a simple game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced. Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition. We also show that each Shapley path scheme of a simple game is population monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. Extensions of these results to other efficient probabilistic values are discussed.     

INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF RISK‐TAKING BEHAVIOR IN TOURNAMENTS—EVIDENCE FROM THE NBA

We empirically explore the relevance and efficiency of risk‐taking behavior in tournaments. We use data from the National Basketball Association (NBA) and measure risk‐taking by the fraction of three‐point shots in basketball games. We examine how point differences between teams during games affect their subsequent risk‐taking behavior. It is found that teams that are trailing are more likely to increase their use of three‐point shots. We additionally analyze the consequences of this change in behavior. Enhanced risk‐taking is inefficient in the vast majority of cases and is only beneficial if a team is trailing by a rather large margin. We discuss possible explanations for these decision errors. (JEL M5, D81, J30)     

On the Complexity of Constructing Evolutionary Trees

In this paper we study a few important tree optimization problems with applications to computational biology. These problems ask for trees that are consistent with an as large part of the given data as possible. We show that the maximum homeomorphic agreement subtree problem cannot be approximated within a factor of , where N is the input size, for any 0 in polynomial time unless P = NP, even if all the given trees are of height 2. On the other hand, we present an O(N log N)-time heuristic for the restriction of this problem to instances with O(1) trees of height O(1) yielding solutions within a constant factor of the optimum. We prove that the maximum inferred consensus tree problem is NP-complete, and provide a simple, fast heuristic for it yielding solutions within one third of the optimum. We also present a more specialized polynomial-time heuristic for the maximum inferred local consensus tree problem.     

Living with unfairness: The limits of equal opportunity in a market economy

Equality of opportunity is often presented as a criterion which reconciles egalitarianism with principles of freedom and responsibility. This paper distinguishes between the principle of starting-line equality, which requires that everyones initial opportunities, assessed in relation to what is publicly known ex ante, are equal, and the principle that equal efforts should yield equal ex post rewards. It argues that the first principle is compatible with allocation of resources through markets but, because of the division of knowledge, the second is not. If we want the opportunities which markets give us, we have to accept ex post unfairness. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a workshop on the measurement of freedom at the London School of Economics, and at a conference on non-welfarist issues in normative economics at the University of Caen. I thank participants at those meetings, and particularly Tania Burchardt, Marco Mariotti and Franz Prettenthaler, for comments. My work on this paper was supported by the Leverhulme Trust.     

When Passion Leads to Problematic Outcomes: A Look at Gambling

Vallerand et al. (2003) have proposed that individuals can have two distinct types of passion toward an activity. Harmonious passion, an internal force leading one to choose to engage in the activity, is proposed to be associated with positive consequences. Obsessive passion, an internal pressure forcing one to engage in an activity, is posited to be associated with negative consequences. The present study sought to determine the role of the two types of passion in various cognitive and affective states associated with dependence and problems with gambling. Participants (n = 412) were recruited at the Montréal Casino and given a questionnaire measuring passion toward gambling, as well as consequences associated with dependence and problem gambling. Results showed that obsessive passion for gambling predicted poorer vitality and concentration in daily tasks, as well as increased rumination, anxiety, negative mood, guilt, and problem gambling. These relations were not found for harmonious passion for gambling. Results are discussed in light of the motivational approach to passion (Vallerand et al., 2003).