Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit

This paper develops a framework to assess how fear of miscoordination affects the sustainability of cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson and van Damme (1993), it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. Lack of common knowledge leads players to second guess each other's behavior and makes coordination difficult. This restricts the range of equilibria and highlights the role of miscoordination payoffs in determining whether cooperation is sustainable or not. The paper characterizes the range of perfect Bayesian equilibria as the players' information becomes arbitrarily precise. Unlike in one‐shot two‐by‐two games, the global games information structure does not yield equilibrium uniqueness.     

Polynomial approximations of multivariate smooth functions from quasi-random data

We improve a Monte Carlo algorithm which computes accurate approximations of smooth functions on multidimensional Tchebychef polynomials by using quasi-random sequences. We first show that the convergence of the previous algorithm is twice faster using these sequences. Then, we slightly modify this algorithm to make it work from a single set of random or quasi-random points. This especially leads to a Quasi-Monte Carlo method with an increased rate of convergence for numerical integration.     

Telehealth for Patients with Chronic Pain: Exploring a Successful and an Unsuccessful Outcome

Abstract

Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is effective for treating chronic pain, but little is known about the mechanisms that might facilitate or hinder its utility when delivered by videoconference. In a single-case experimental design, we explored the outcomes of two adults with chronic pain who were provided with videoconference-based CBT. The goal was to examine the relationship between therapeutic alliance as well as presence felt and clinical outcomes. Therapeutic alliance was high overall for both participants; however, only the successful case’s alliance ratings significantly increased over treatment. Levels of presence felt in videoconferencing were also high, but were not related to therapy outcome.     

Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution

We consider cooperatives games (TU-games) enriched by a system of a priori unions and a communication forest graph which are independent from each other. These two structures reflect the limitations of cooperation possibilities. In this framework, we introduce four Owen-type allocation rules, which are defined by a two-step application of an allocation rule à la Owen (in: Henn R, Moeschlin O (eds) Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, 1977) to TU-games with a priori unions where the TU-game is replaced by Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 2:225–229, 1977) graph-restricted TU-game. The four possibilities arise by applying, at each step, either the Myerson value (Myerson 1977) or the average tree solution (Herings et al. in Games Econ Behav 62:77–92, 2008). Our main result offers comparable axiomatizations of these four allocation rules.

     

Nullified equal loss property and equal division values

We provide characterizations of the equal division values and their convex mixtures, using a new axiom on a fixed player set based on player nullification which requires that if a player becomes null, then any two other players are equally affected. Two economic applications are also introduced concerning bargaining under risk and common-pool resource appropriation.     

Do Infants Recognize Engagement in Social Interactions? The Case of Face‐to‐Face Conversation

This study explores 12‐month‐olds' understanding of face‐to‐face conversation, a key contextual structure associated with engagement in a social interaction. Using a violation‐of‐expectations paradigm, we habituated infants to a “face‐to‐face” conversation, and in a test phase compared their looking times between “back‐to‐back” (conceptually novel) and “face‐to‐face” (conceptually familiar) conversations, while simultaneously manipulating perceptual familiarity in a 2 × 2 factorial design. We also analyzed dynamic changes in pupil dilation, which are considered a reliable measure of cognitive load that may index processing of social interactions. Infants looked relatively longer at perceptual changes (new speaker positions) but not at conceptual change (back‐to‐back conversation), suggesting that face‐to‐face conversation may not elicit particular expectations, and so may not carry any particular conceptual significance. Moreover, on the first test trial, larger pupil dilation was observed for familiar conditions, suggesting that familiarity with perceptual features could enhance processing of conversations. Thus, this study undermines assertions regarding infants' conceptual understanding of the social signals underlying engagement. Infants may rather recognize such signals through their perceptual familiarity and associated positive feelings. This may then increase their engagement when observing and participating in others' collaborative activities, in turn allowing for the development of knowledge regarding others' intentions.     

Régionalisation des transports collectifs : la fabrication d’une réforme « consensuelle »

Public transit is now a major power exercised by regions in France. The regionalization of public transportation, which started in the early 1980s, is analyzed in relation to a new pattern of major players, namely: the central government, local authorities and the French national railway system (SNCF). This pattern has emerged as a compromise, has gradually been worked out between two rationales: the one advocating a revival of local rail services; and the other, the preservation of funding by the state and the SNCF. Arising out of a work of mediation and out of strategies for enlisting reformers (mainly among politicians and from the SNCF) into a coalition, this compromise has bought about an ambiguous consensus among elected officials from left- and right-wing parties, executives from the SNCF, elected regional officials and representatives of railway workers who do not all share a priori either the same interests or the same conception of the general interest.