THE DEMISE OF HOSPITAL PHILANTHROPY

We develop a one-period model of hospital and donor behavior to analyze how insurance for hospital care, various public subsidies, and other factors affect donations to hospitals. Theoretically, increased insurance coverage has an ambiguous effect on private giving. Empirical tests using time series and cross-sectional data show that the growth of private insurance and especially the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid substantially reduces private giving to hospitals. Effects of public subsidies for construction depend on whether the subsidy more closely resembles a matching or lumpsum grant.     

THE NONMONETARY EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL FACTORS DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

This paper employs vector autoregressions to estimate the nonmonetary effects of financial sector shocks on output and prices during the interwar period. Variance decompositions indicate that the nonmonetary financial proxies have significant and important effects. Impulse response functions indicate that most of the significant shocks to our financial crisis proxies have negative effects on output and prices. Focusing on the depressed conditions of the 1930s, historical decompositions indicate that the nonmonetay financial crisis variables are generally more important than the monetary base in explaining macro behavior. Our findings thus support theoretical models emphasizing the important nonmonetay effects of financial variables.     

THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR AND THE EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF U.S. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

The paper examines two central theories advanced to explain the revealed comparative advantage of U.S. industries. The neo-technological account centers on the process of innovation among industries and is represented in the regression analysis by an R&D intensity variable. The neofactor theory advances both human and "physical" capital as important variables in determining countries' comparative advantage. Foreign protection is postulated to affect the export performance of U.S. industries. Generally the results suggest that U.S. revealed comparative advantage is most pronounced in R&D intensive industries that give the U.S. a temporary technological lead in world markets.     

THE BIASES OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANK PRESIDENTS

This paper develops statistical tests which show that in Federal Open Market Committee voting, Federal Reserve bank presidents, as a group, prefer less expansionary monetary policy than Federal Reserve board members. Further tests show that a subset of Federal Reserve bank presidents vote in a manner which is consistent with the partisanship of the U.S. president during whose term they were appointed. Membership in this subset is highly correlated with a career as an economist. These results have implications for reforms which would alter the voting power of bank presidents on the FOMC.