ON THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF CASH TRANSFERS AND SUBSIDIES

This paper considers the relative efficiency of cash grants and subsidies when society's goal is to raise the welfare of a household. When the head of the household makes all consumption decisions, a principal-agent problem is created: the head acts as the agent of the government in allocating the transferred resources. Subsidies to commodities with particular characteristics may be a more efficient way to guarantee that benefits are shared within the household. Though related to the old notion of paternalism, this theory leads to more specific predictions regarding the kinds of commodities that can be efficiently subsidized.     

Direct Modelling of Regression Effects for Transition Probabilities in Multistate Models

Abstract.  A simple and standard approach for analysing multistate model data is to model all transition intensities and then compute a summary measure such as the transition probabilities based on this. This approach is relatively simple to implement but it is difficult to see what the covariate effects are on the scale of interest. In this paper, we consider an alternative approach that directly models the covariate effects on transition probabilities in multistate models. Our new approach is based on binomial modelling and inverse probability of censoring weighting techniques and is very simple to implement by standard software. We show how to do flexible regression models with possibly time-varying covariate effects.     

A SIMPLE MODEL OF OPTIMAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION

We present a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation. We show that even if the direct harm to victims of hate crime is the same as for other crimes, because of other differences in the effects it may still be optimal to exert a different level of law‐enforcement effort to deter or prevent hate crime. These differences also have previously unrecognized effects on the optimal level of effort by potential hate crime victims to avoid being victimized, thus affecting the efficiency of government policies that encourage or discourage such effort. In some cases, the optimal level of government effort may be lower for hate crimes than for other crimes. Our analysis suggests a role for policy tools that influence individual avoidance effort directly. We discuss the implications of our results for similar types of crime, including terrorism. (JEL K42, K14, D02)