"Her" Marriage after the Revolutions

Recent social changes have made husbands' emotional investments and wives' perceptions of equity in the division of housework crucial for women's marital happiness. But wives are also happiest in their marriages when they share a strong normative commitment to lifelong marriage with their husbands and when their husbands take the lead in breadwinning. Thus our research suggests that elements of the new and the old promote marital happiness among contemporary wives.     

Communicating Global Activism

Many observers doubt the capacity of digital media to change the political game. The rise of a transnational activism that is aimed beyond states and directly at corporations, trade and development regimes offers a fruitful area for understanding how communication practices can help create a new politics. The Internet is implicated in the new global activism far beyond merely reducing the costs of communication, or transcending the geographical and temporal barriers associated with other communication media. Various uses of the Internet and digital media facilitate the loosely structured networks, the weak identity ties, and the patterns of issue and demonstration organizing that define a new global protest politics. Analysis of various cases shows how digital network configurations can facilitate: permanent campaigns; the growth of broad networks despite relatively weak social identity and ideology ties; transformation of individual member organizations and whole networks; and the capacity to communicate messages from desktops to television screens. The same qualities that make these communication-based politics durable also make them vulnerable to problems of control, decision-making and collective identity.     

Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule. Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002 This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.