Scaling up CBOs for second‐order devolution in welfare reform

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 created a paradigm shift in the financing, organization, and delivery of welfare programs in the United States. The act shifted revenue and authority to states, giving them great discretion to determine the specifics of their programs. First‐order devolution, combined with time limits and work requirements, set in motion a chain of events that moved Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) recipients into the labor force and off state welfare rolls. Second‐order devolution shifted revenue and authority to community‐based organizations (CBOs) to help former recipients remain employed, advance to higher paying jobs, and move their families toward economic self‐sufficiency. Early findings from project innovations in Texas and other states raise doubts about the capacity of these organizations to achieve these goals. State funders will need to provide ongoing technical assistance and support to “scale up” the capacity of CBOs to plan, implement, and manage local innovations in welfare reform.     

Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule. Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002 This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Loss functions for estimation of extrema with an application to disease mapping

It is often of interest to find the maximum or near maxima among a set of vector‐valued parameters in a statistical model; in the case of disease mapping, for example, these correspond to relative‐risk “hotspots” where public‐health intervention may be needed. The general problem is one of estimating nonlinear functions of the ensemble of relative risks, but biased estimates result if posterior means are simply substituted into these nonlinear functions. The authors obtain better estimates of extrema from a new, weighted ranks squared error loss function. The derivation of these Bayes estimators assumes a hidden‐Markov random‐field model for relative risks, and their behaviour is illustrated with real and simulated data.     

An empirical examination of cost-adjusting in outpatient clinics

This paper presents an empirical methodology for examining cost-adjusting in relation to multiple-output health care providers. The methodology is subsequently implemented using a sample of California outpatient clinics. The empirical evidence is that these clinics do cost-adjust; that is, the clinics respond to low Medicare reimbursement by using lower quality to control the marginal costs of those patient groups not insured under a government-sponsored plan. In addition, clinics do not cost-adjust with respect to Medi-Cal patients, implying that various government reimbursement systems have different effects on a provider’s cost-adjusting behavior.     

A non-profit approach to addressing the effects of urbanization in the Lake Pontchartrain Basin, Louisiana

The Lake Pontchartrain Basin in southeast Louisiana is an estuarine watershed encompassing New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and wetlands that are an integral part of Louisiana's unique culture. In recent decades rapid growth and poorly planned development have resulted in a decrease in water quality and habitat loss, especially in St. Tammany Parish on the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain. In 1989, the Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation (LPBF), an environmental, non-profit organization, was formed to address and rectify environmental issues in the Basin. LPBF accomplishes its mission through programs addressing water quality, habitat protection, geographic information science, public access, and education.LPBF used the recent, rapid development occurring in St. Tammany Parish as a case study to examine the relationship between land use, water quality, and development in the Basin by investigating habitat change/urbanization, development in flood plains, and water quality. Through the integration of LPBF programs, it was found that urbanization is having a devastating impact on the parish's natural habitats and severely degrading water quality. Using these results, LPBF is educating Basin citizens on the protection of their habitats and water quality to insure that these resources may be available for future generations.     

International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.