Tax-funded unionism: The unemployment connection

Labor unions are widely regarded as private organizations which finance their activities exclusively through revenues collected from members and others who are covered by collective bargaining agreements. In reality, however, U.S. unions receive millions of dollars each year through grants and contracts from federal, state, and local governments for a variety of purposes, including aid to the unemployed; these funds are used (sometimes illegally) to finance union operations, including political activities. This article briefly explores the phenomenon of tax-funded unionism.     

Significance tests and spurious correlation in regression models with autocorrelated errors

In this paper, we report some results on the exact significance level when the usual F-statistic is used in a linear regression model with autocorrelated disturbances. The exact tail area probabilities sometimes differ substantially from the nominal size used in an ‘F-test’ and from upper-bound probabilities derived by Kiviet (1979) which do not depend on the values of the regressors. A similar conclusion is also reached for the exact size of the significance tests for the spurious regressions considered by Granger and Newbold (1974, 1977). The results indicate once more that one has to be careful when using an algebraic F-test in the presence of autoregressive errors. However then too, the Durbin-Watson test is expected to indicate the presence of autocorrelation.     

Resources and strategies of interest groups and industry representatives involved in federal forest policy

This study analyzes the resources and strategies of public interest groups and industry representatives involved in federal forest policy in the state of Oregon during the early 1990s. While many studies have examined the role of interest groups in the policy process, few have compared empirically the resources available and strategies pursued by industry representatives and public interest groups in a particular policy domain. Utilizing survey data from 133 business representatives and 326 public interest groups involved in federal forest policy, the study argues that public interest group influence derives primarily from the ability to mobilize human resources; the financial resources of these groups tend to be modest. Industry and industry-supported groups, in contrast, possess considerable financial power while enjoying less support from the public. Consequently, industry interests tend to focus their efforts on more traditional forms of influence such as the persistent lobbying of natural resource agencies and elected officials. Public interest groups, in contrast, tend to devote considerable efforts to building public support in urban core areas to build the capacity to pressure governmental decision-makers.