Is Poker a Game of Skill or Chance? A Quasi-Experimental Study

Due to intensive marketing and the rapid growth of online gambling, poker currently enjoys great popularity among large sections of the population. Although poker is legally a game of chance in most countries, some (particularly operators of private poker web sites) argue that it should be regarded as a game of skill or sport because the outcome of the game primarily depends on individual aptitude and skill. The available findings indicate that skill plays a meaningful role; however, serious methodological weaknesses and the absence of reliable information regarding the relative importance of chance and skill considerably limit the validity of extant research. Adopting a quasi-experimental approach, the present study examined the extent to which the influence of poker playing skill was more important than card distribution. Three average players and three experts sat down at a six-player table and played 60 computer-based hands of the poker variant “Texas Hold’em” for money. In each hand, one of the average players and one expert received (a) better-than-average cards (winner’s box), (b) average cards (neutral box) and (c) worse-than-average cards (loser’s box). The standardized manipulation of the card distribution controlled the factor of chance to determine differences in performance between the average and expert groups. Overall, 150 individuals participated in a “fixed-limit” game variant, and 150 individuals participated in a “no-limit” game variant. ANOVA results showed that experts did not outperform average players in terms of final cash balance. Rather, card distribution was the decisive factor for successful poker playing. However, expert players were better able to minimize losses when confronted with disadvantageous conditions (i.e., worse-than-average cards). No significant differences were observed between the game variants. Furthermore, supplementary analyses confirm differential game-related actions dependent on the card distribution, player status, and game variant. In conclusion, the study findings indicate that poker should be regarded as a game of chance, at least under certain basic conditions, and suggest new directions for further research.     

Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power

We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders. We also elicit responders’ willingness to pay for (un)conditional veto power. The bids reveal a large endowment effect.     

Climate events and the role of adaptive capacity for (im-)mobility

Population and Environment - The study examines the relationship between sudden- and gradual-onset climate events and migration, hypothesizing that this relationship is mediated by the adaptive...     

The effect of outside directors’ and auditors’ incentives on managers’ ability to manage cash bonuses

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors’ and auditors’ monetary incentives on the association between discretionary accounting and managers’ cash bonuses in a two-tier system. For a sample of German stock corporations from 2005 to 2007 we expect and find that outside directors who receive compensation based on accounting income and auditors who receive high non-audit fees have the incentive to tolerate managers’ bonus-increasing accounting choices. More specifically, we show that positive discretionary accruals are more strongly associated with managers’ cash bonuses than negative discretionary accruals if outside directors receive accounting-based compensation and/or if auditors receive high non-audit fees. Our results suggest that executives’ ability to manage their cash bonuses depends on the monitoring institutions’ monetary incentives.     

Kommunikationsprobleme in Teams mit hoher aufgabenbezogener Diversität: Ursachen und Möglichkeiten zur Intervention

This paper starts with an analysis, based on the communication theories of Schulz von Thun (2000) and Clark (1996), of the reasons why teams with a high task-related diversity are particularly susceptible to communication problems. To reduce communication problems, a modularly composed training- and team-development concept, which applies on “individual” and “team” levels, is subsequently presented. Communication problems are defined as failure in understanding as well as low level of task-related openness and as absence of esteem and acceptance between communicating participants.     

Do Temporary Workers Receive Risk Premiums? Assessing the Wage Effects of Fixed–term Contracts in West Germany by a Matching Estimator Compared with Parametric Approaches

The wage effects of fixed–term contracts (FTCs) are analysed with the German Socio–Economic Panel (GSOEP) for West Germany. Taking selection on observables into account results in an estimated wage effect of −6 percent up to −10 percent. Controlling additionally for selection on unobservables leads to wage effects of −23 percent, which may be explained by self–selection of workers. The results also highlight the importance of asymmetric information as an explanation for the incentive for employers as well as workers to enter FTCs.     

The geometry of Gaussian double Markovian distributions

Gaussian double Markovian models consist of covariance matrices constrained by a pair of graphs specifying zeros simultaneously in the matrix and its inverse. We study the semi-algebraic geometry of these models, in particular their dimension, smoothness, and connectedness as well as algebraic and combinatorial properties.