Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule. Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002 This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

A “brer rabbit” case for reverse mandated benefits

Reverse mandated benefits is a government-mandated policy that requires employees to provide their employers with benefits that workers would not provide otherwise. Of course, only those benefits would be mandated that are worth more to employers than they cost, as determined by political authorities. My case for such a policy argues that it is at least as sensible as policies mandating that employers provide benefits to their employees that would not be provided otherwise.     

Freedom of movement vs. exclusion: a reinterpretation of the "insider"-"outsider" divide in the European Union

"This article argues that the question of free movement vs. exclusion within the European Union (EU) can be addressed satisfactorily only if we move away from the narrow state-centrism inherent in the current debate. What is required is to 'open' the state concept and examine the implications of state-society relations for EU policy making. Once this is done, it can be seen that the exclusionist stance of the immigration policy and the essentially intergovernmental nature of the policy making are due to an implicit contract between states and constituents implied by the concepts of nationality and citizenship. According to this perspective, the focus on the state or the political elite alone is too one-sided and misses the more complex factors bearing upon EU policy making in this area."     

Going to Pieces: Paul Monette and the Fragments of the Tribe

Author of the highly acclaimed Borrowed Time: An AIDS Memoir (1988) and winner of the 1992 National Book Award for his autobiography Becoming a Man: Half a Life Story, Paul Monette died of complications from AIDS in Los Angeles on February 12, 1995. His most recent work, Last Watch of the Night: Essays Too Personal and Otherwise (1994), is his third volume in a trilogy of autobiographical writing on growing up gay, coming-out, and living with AIDS. A graduate of Phillips Academy and Yale University, Monette received a number of awards for his writing and his work as an outspoken voice in the battle against AIDS, including the National Book Award, three Lambda Literary awards, the PEN Center West Freedom to Write Award, and three honorary doctorate degrees, from Wesleyan University, the City University of New York, and the State University of New York at Oswego. A memorial service was held for Monette on Sunday, February 19, 1995, at the Directors Guild of America on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles. Paul Monette was 49.