Touristic authenticity,touristic angst,and modern reality

The tourist has become the symbol of a peculiarly modern type of inauthenticity. This paper explores the criticisms that have been directed at the reality experiences of the tourist. In so doing, the following inexhaustive typology of touristic realities is developed: 1) the first-order or true tourist, 2) the second-order or Angst-ridden tourist, 3( the third-order or anthropological tourist, and 4) the fourth-order or spiritual tourist. Each of these types represents a progressively more intense search for reality through travel. Each is, however, criticized for participating in its own form of inauthenticity.After exploring the reality experiences and criticisms of each of these travellers, the paper turns the tables on the cultured despisers of tourism to argue that perhaps the lowly first-order tourist is not so inauthentic after all. True, this traveller may not be having a real heroic adventure, but such is not the goal. Rather, the reality experienced by the first-order tourist is a pleasurable liberation from the normal concerns of everyday life which simultaneously reaffirms commitment to that reality. Quite frequently the first-order tourist is less concerned about having a real experience in the visited place than in experiencing family and friendship relationships-relationships completely ignored by the anti-touristic tourists in their search for authenticity in someone else's reality.The author would like to thank Peter L. Berger, Harry C. Bredemeier, Warren I. Susman, and M. Kathy Kenyon for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. This research was supported in part by NIMH grant no. 5 T32 NH14660.     

Immigration reform in France and the United States: reflections and documentation

This paper analyzes similarities and dissimilarities in French and American efforts to come to grip with irregular migration. The symbolic importance of immigration reform is argued to be a key political concern in both nations, although the politics of immigration reform has assumed a more partisan flavor in France, particularly since the municipal elections of 1983. In France, the theme of control and security, associated with the notion of preventing "automatic" immigration which would endanger the cohesion of French society, was widely utilized for political ends prior to and after May 10, 1981 (the date of Francois Mitterand's investiture). The American government, on the other hand, is confronted with the unenviable task of obtaining a legislative consensus on legalization and employer sanctions through an approach seeking to harmonize and integrate the demands articulated by various groups: employers, unions, and alien and ethnic interest groups (principally Hispanic groups divided into a hierarchy along a recently arrived/established cleavage). The American situation most sharply differs from the French case in terms of the absence of a right/left political cleavage. The real effects of clandestine immigration are to be found at the local level. In France, as in the US, the ability of local actors to exert pressure raises the fear that legalization and sanctions will change little, except in terms of symbolic legitimacy.     

Illegal immigrants in Canada: recent developments

Immigration policies and their management in a country like Canada have long been an interesting and instructive study for other countries. 1) With borders naturally protected by great distance from almost all migrant routes; 2) with a long, undefended border with the US and a further 3000 kilometers to its border on the south; 3) with a parliamentary system capable of comparatively rapid legislative and administrative responses to problems; and 4) with a relatively small legal, and even smaller illegal, population Canada had historically "experimented" with novel, often quite creative, immigration policies and programs to both encourage and control the increases in its population. This paper summarizes what Canada did and is doing in response to am important item of public policy--the entry and presence of illegal migrants. Canada has experimented with 1) discretionary amnesty for long-term illegals with a capacity to be successfully integrated into Canadian life, 2) tighter border controls with the extended use of the visitor's visa, and 3) employer sanctions. To address the problem more substantively, however, requires detailed study and significant change, including legislative change.     

Singapore's foreign workforce: some reflections on its benefits and costs

"This article provides some empirical information pertaining to the benefits and costs of foreign labor to Singapore and subjects to critical analysis some of Pang and Lim's hypotheses concerning the costs of labor importation presented in a previous article.... The article concludes with a discussion of the real cost to Malaysia of Singapore's labor importation policies and its potential for disruption of Malaysia's development plans."     

Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core

In recent papers, somewhat conflicting results on the generic emptiness of the core have been proven. Rubinstein (1979) has shown that the core is generically empty in the Kannai topology even without a restriction on the dimensionality of the alternative space. Schofield (1980) finds the core generically empty in the Whitney-C topology, but requires a dimensionality condition. This note explores the apparent conflict by proving a generalization of Rubinstein's result for the Whitney-C ⁰ topology, and showing that the result does not extend to the Whitney-C ¹ topology without a dimensionality condition.I would like to thank Kim Border and Richard McKelvey for their helpful discussion and comments. This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant no. SES 78-2478781     

Poland's crisis and East European socialism

Conclusion We began this article by asking whether the Polish crisis is a socialist or a Polish disease. By citing the structural factors, we brought out the common difficulties affecting all East European societies in their political and economic development. These difficulties arose out of the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth and the consequent need to replace political mobilization of the population with their political integration. The structural contradictions occurred together with conjunctural developments in the world economy, the collapse of detente, the post-war demographic explosion, and natural calamities. Poland was least able to cope with these structural and conjunctural dynamics. The result was a society united on a national basis in its conflicts with the Party State apparatus. This conflict was never resolved by Solidarity nor by the subsequent military coup.While Poland and Romania had quite similar structural and conjunctural dynamics, it was only in Poland that the constellation of nation-specific factors yielded a societal reaction of system-threatening character. Looking at the rest of Eastern Europe, we do not see a similar constellation of factors. Rather, the combination of structural, conjunctural, and specific conditions has prevented the deeper contradictions from evolving into Solidarity-type mass movements of the Polish variety. Thus, we believe that the Polish developments will not be replicated in any of the other East European countries in the foreseeable future.Does this mean that the Polish experience is so unique that it is without relevance for the other East European states? On the contrary, the recognition of common structural problems points to fundamental conflicts in all the countries of actually existing socialism. The essence of these conflicts may be the same. It is the ability to identify and deal with them that distinguishes one East European regime from another. This ability varies with the specific and conjunctural factors as applied to each country. While there is little likelihood that the Polish disease will spread, this is partly because the other East European states are beginning to take preventive measures. In other words, they are learning from the Polish experience.There are several indicators that these regimes have learned from the Polish crisis. We can summarize them in the following predictions:First, we believe that state power and the repressive apparatus of the various East European countries will be reinforced and made more effective. This applies not so much to overt shows of force but to more sophisticated methods of social control and repression: e.g., limiting information channels, dispersing dissident groups, giving in to workers protests before they spread, taking practical measures to prevent consumer shortages from getting out of hand, and the like.Second, we can expect that oppositional forces, especially intellectuals, will be increasingly restricted in their ability to formulate and articulate system-threatening demands. The East European states will take any measures - jail, slander, internal deportation, cooptation, forced emigration - to make sure that intellectuals' contact with workers is weakened or at least strictly supervised.Third, we can expect the Eastern European states to take further measures to integrate potential system-threatening movements into the official system. We will see further attempts to improve the access possibilities for those social interests that have up to now been neglected, e.g. in physical and social infrastructures, neglected regions. Moreover, there will be renewed efforts to make the system of political socialization (education, propaganda, culture) more effective. Finally, we can expect anti-corruption campaigns within the State, Party, and industrial bureaucracies as the elites attempt to make these organs more legitimate in the eyes of the population.In recent months there seems to be considerable evidence that the East European regimes have taken all these measures. There have been attempts to re-invigorate the official trade unions. Yuri Andropov's succession was marked by a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign designed to win favor among rank-and-file workers. In Romania there have been exhortations towards more self-sufficiency and self-management, so that individual producers will be less dependent on State retail outlets, and the country less dependent on costly foreign imports. The reduction in East-West trade and decline of detente have also given more leeway for the East European repressive apparatus to crack down on dissidents and oppositional movements.With reduced trade, the economic benefits of detente no longer exist as a restraining factor on the authorities. The West now has reduced influence on domestic politics in East Europe. The combination of integration and repressive measures has so far prevented the structural contradictions from growing into true political crises of the Polish variety. Eastern Europe (and Poland) is remarkably quiet.With the broad enthusiasm fostered in the West by the rise of Solidarity, it is understandable that its brutal demise had generated parallel feelings of disillusionment. It would be erroneous to consider the Polish events as an archetype for Eastern Europe. The problems of East European regimes reflect a general system crisis (economic and political), each country's response depends on specific local conditions and fortuitous conjunctures. If the Polish events are to be understood, they must be explained as a variant in a larger East European context.Having concentrated on the crisis aspects in Poland and Romania should not blind us from the fact that these systems have an amazing ability to reproduce themselves - to muddle through. Actually existing socialism is more than simply brute force. Each of the East European societies exhibits a complex dialectic between the forces of functional stability and the forces of immanent contradictions. As such, in addition to their structural aspects, we must analyze each of these societies in their differing vulnerability to conjunctural events and in their specific political, social, and cultural characters.For those who seek to replace actually existing socialism with a more emancipatory socialism, the Polish crisis constitutes a key point of departure. It should be discussed both in terms of what it means for Poland, and for Eastern Europe. The Polish events provide further evidence that the tasks of social theory reside as much in explaining why societies muddle through as why they fall apart.     

Alternative theory and utopian models

A theoretical model of human systems is presented based on the basic paradigms upon which families, groups, and social systems can be organized. Four fundamentally distinct paradigms are described and the interrelationships among them explored, with special consideration given to the social evolution of systems organized on these paradigms. Implications for the study of alternative lifestyles and utopian societies are discussed.Portions of this paper are based on a presentation at the Fifth Annual Conference on Utopian Studies, Pennsylvania State University, 11 October 1980. The author wishes to thank Rich Erlich, Barry Singer, and Kersti Yllo for valuable comments on earlier versions. Inquiries to the author: 22 Bulette Road, Acton, Massachusetts 01720.