DO UNIONIZED FIRMS HIRE BETTER WORKERS?

It is a strong prior among many economists that unionized firms hire better-quality workers to offset higher union wages. In fact, standard economic theory does not support this prior. The key insights introduced by this paper are that, first, unions will likely raise future wages to reflect improvements in worker quality and, second, that unionized firms, anticipating this, often do better by hiring lower-quality workers. This surprising result has empirical support.     

Some Remarks on Statistical Education

A definition of the subject of statistics is given, and the difference between the chalkboard world of the teacher of statistics and the real world of the experimenter is stressed. An overemphasis on significance testing, hypothesis testing, and decision procedures has led to a de-emphasis of statistical design. The teaching of statistical design theory, statistics teaching in a changing world, the importance of model building, and different approaches to teaching statistics are discussed. Some published materials developed to meet teaching needs and a new type of statistics course are described. Information about special issues in statistical education (teaching and consulting) is presented.     

An Analysis of the Game of Tennis

The American Statistical Association conducted a pilot study to develop methodology to conduct a nationwide evaluation of survey practices and the quality of survey data. This article is a report on the objectives and principal findings of that pilot study. In addition, the objectives of the nationwide study are presented.     

Unit-Root Tests and Asymmetric Adjustment With an Example Using the Term Structure of Interest Rates

This article develops critical values to test the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity with asymmetric adjustment. Specific attention is paid to threshold and momentum threshold autoregressive processes. The standard Dickey–Fuller tests emerge as a special case. Within a reasonable range of adjustment parameters, the power of the new tests is shown to be greater than that of the corresponding Dickey–Fuller test. The use of the tests is illustrated using the term structure of interest rates. It is shown that the movements toward the long-run equilibrium relationship are best estimated as an asymmetric process.     

Specification and Identification of Stochastic Demand Models

This paper is concerned with stochastic demand systems for continuous choices that arise from structural random utility models. It examines under which nonparametric conditions on the structural random utility specification the implied reduced form model is nonsingular and invertible. For parametric members within this class of random utility models, the paper provides conditions for local identification from the reduced form under moment assumptions.     

Odds ratio inference from stratified samples

One of the common problems encountered in applied statistics is that of comparing two proportions from stratified samples. One approach to this problem is via inference on the corresponding odds ratio. In this paper, the various point and interval estimators of and hypothesis testing procedures for a common odds ratio from multiple 2 ×2 tables are reviewed. Based On research to date, the conditional maximum likelihood and Mantel-Haenszel estimators are recommended as the point estimators of choice. Neither confidence intervals nor hypothesis testing metthods have been studied as well as the point estimators, but there is a confidence interval method associated with the Mantel-Haenszel estimator that is a good choice.     

A comment on ‘the extraordinary claim of praxeology’ by Professor Gutiérrez

Ludvig von Mises and the Austrian School of Praxeological Economics do make a claim that can only be considered extraordinary, considering the type of methodology that now pervades our social science Establishment. And the claim is that there is economic knowledge that can be both known with apodictic certainty, and be of great usefulness in understanding the world in which we live. Prof. Gutiérrez, defending the accepted view that knowledge can either be known with apodictic certainty, or have usefulness for understanding the real world, but not both, attacks praxeological allegations to the contrary, and is in turn, criticized by the author. Under contention are the status of the a priori nature of the category of human action, the basic premise of praxeology, as well as several other claims:

1. Human action can only be undertaken by individual actors
2. Action necessarily requires a desired end and a technological plan
3. Human action necessarily aims at improving the future
4. Human action necessarily involves a choice among competing ends
5. All means are necessarily scarce
6. The actor must rank his alternative ends
7. Choices continually change, both because of changed ends as well as means
8. Labor power and nature logically predate, and were used to form, capital
9. Technological knowledge is a factor of production

This exchange involves not so much specific disagreements between Gutiérrez and the author as it does the different world views of two competing philosophies of social science. To put it in its historical perspective, what we have here can be characterized as evolving from the debates concerning the possibility of synthetic a priori statements, first raised by Immanuel Kant and David Hume, but applied to the conceptual foundations of modern economics.     

Preference extension rules for ranking sets of alternatives with a fixed cardinality

This paper analyzes the problem of deriving a ranking of fixed-cardinality subsets of a universal set from a given ranking of the elements of this universal set. Only subsets with a given number of elements are being ranked, which is where the approach in this paper differs from the literature on extension rules that establish preference relations on the power set of the universal set. Common examples for areas where such preferences on subsets with a fixed cardinality are needed are elections of committees of a given size, many-to-one matchings, and decision problems under ignorance. The main result of the paper is a characterization of a class oflexicographic rank-ordered rules by means of two axioms, namely, aresponsiveness condition used in the matching literature and a well-knownneutrality requirement which ensures that the names of the alternatives are irrelevant for the ranking of the sets.