Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power

We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders. We also elicit responders’ willingness to pay for (un)conditional veto power. The bids reveal a large endowment effect.     

Correction of 'On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement'

Theory and Decision -     

Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Europe: A Comparative Perspective

The article uses available survey data to depict the depth and spread of anti-Semitic attitudes across Europe. The main assumption is that European anti-Semitism, both currently and historically, is closely tied to issues and crises of national self-identification; for this reason, social identity theory is employed to study the varying configurations of anti-Semitic prejudice. In most European countries, Jews are a small and socially integrated minority. Attitudes toward them are determined less by concrete experiences of cultural differences, or conflicts over scarce resources, but rather by a perceived threat to the national self-image. This leads to an accentuation of the pertinent prejudices that blame Jews to be responsible for that threat. This perspective brings to light considerable differences between Eastern and Western Europe and the continuing influence of national traditions.     

Invariant structures of prognosis curves in Forrester's World Dynamics

This paper deals with some results of various simulations with Forrester's World Dynamics. These simulations concern the temporal and quantitative fixing of limits in relation to initial values and deal with the effects of specific table functions in this model. In addition, they also treat the behavior of the curves in approaching the limits.     

Now or Later?--Endogenous Timing of Threats

Whereas early threats are chosen before bargaining, late threats are determined after bargaining ended in conflict. Instead of exogenously imposing the timing of threats, these are derived endogenously as in indirect evolution or endogenous timing. Based on a duopoly market, we first derive the equilibrium for all possible constellations regarding the timing of threats. Our analysis surprisingly justifies the early timing of threats as suggested by Nash (1953).     

Personal space claims as a function of interpersonal threat: The mediating role of need for control

Previous research suggests that the concept of control is central to understanding spatial regulation. Similarly, control motivation appears to underlie the individual difference variable of Type A behavior. Based on this commonality it was hypothesized that Type A behavior would mediate spatial claims in response to situational threat. Results confirmed this hypothesis. Type A's claimed larger spaces overall, and more space in front of the body in response to threat, than Type B's. Differential results for size and shape of personal space suggest the multidimensional nature of spatial regulation.     

Price Manipulation and Quasi‐Arbitrage

In an environment where trading volume affects security prices and where prices are uncertain when trades are submitted, quasi‐arbitrage is the availability of a series of trades that generate infinite expected profits with an infinite Sharpe ratio. We show that when the price impact of trades is permanent and time‐independent, only linear price‐impact functions rule out quasi‐arbitrage and thus support viable market prices. When trades have also a temporary price impact, only the permanent price impact must be linear while the temporary one can be of a more general form. We also extend the analysis to a time‐dependent framework.