The network of global corporations and elite policy groups: a structure for transnational capitalist class formation?

This study situates five top transnational policy–planning groups within the larger structure of corporate power that is constituted through interlocking directorates among the world's largest companies. Each group makes a distinct contribution towards transnational capitalist hegemony both by building consensus within the global corporate elite and by educating publics and states on the virtues of one or another variant of the neo–liberal paradigm. Analysis of corporate–policy interlocks reveals that a few dozen cosmopolitans – primarily men based in Europe and North America and actively engaged in corporate management – knit the network together via participation in transnational interlocking and/or multiple policy groups. As a structure underwriting transnational business activism, the network is highly centralized, yet from its core it extends unevenly to corporations and individuals positioned on its fringes. The policy groups pull the directorates of the world's major corporations together, and collaterally integrate the lifeworld of the global corporate elite, but they do so selectively, reproducing regional differences in participation. These findings support the claim that a well–integrated global corporate elite has formed, and that global policy groups have contributed to its formation. Whether this elite confirms the arrival of a transnational capitalist class is a matter partly of semantics and partly of substance.     

Voting in professional associations: The case of the American sociological association revisited

Who votes in ASA elections? This article examines data on voter turnout from two recent presidential contests of the American Sociological Association in an analysis of the determinants of election participation. Extending the 1981 Ridgeway and Moore study of voting dynamics in the ASA, we hypothesize that intraorganizational networks and particular demongraphic characteristics link ASA members to the discipline in a manner analogous to the way such factors operate in the national electorate. On the basis of data compiled from 1985 and 1986 ASA election returns, we find that network factors are the most salient determinants of voting behavior. We conclude that those organizational ties that effectively link members, however directly or indirectly, to the larger Association are the most predictive of propensity to vote.     

Machismo: Manifestations of a cultural value in the Latin American casino

Casino operations were observed in twelve Latin American countries. Owners, managers, employees, players, and government regulators in each of these countries were interviewed. The concept of machismo is described in its historical and cultural context. It is then used to illuminate casino operations and the mode of play in existence in these casinos.Research activities for this paper were supported by grants from the First Interstate Bank of Las Vegas, Nevada, through the Center for Business Leadership at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and from Tottenham and Associates, Gaming Consultants, London, England.     

A Further Examination of Cumulative Prospect Theory Parameterizations

Recent experimental studies have focused on fitting parameterized functional forms to cumulative prospect theory's weighting function. This paper examines the behavioral implications of the functional forms and the estimated parameters. We find that none of the parameterizations can simultaneously account for gambling on unlikely gains and the Allais paradox behavior or other strong choice patterns from experiments. Parameter estimates that lead to reasonable amounts of insurance and gambling behavior tend to also generate large risk premia. Taken as a whole, the analysis suggests that the functional forms proposed in the literature are not suitable for generalization to applied settings.     

La falta de brazos

Sans résumé

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The replacement principle in economies with indivisible goods

 We consider the problem of allocating a list of indivisible goods and some amount of an infinitely divisible good among agents with equal rights on these resources, and investigate the implications of the following requirement on allocation rules: when the preferences of some of the agents change, all agents whose preferences are fixed should (weakly) gain, or they should all (weakly) lose. This condition is an application of a general principle of solidarity discussed in Thomson (1990b) under the name “replacement principle”. We look for selections from the no-envy solution satisfying this property. We show that in the general case, when the number of objects is arbitrary, there is no such selection. However, in the one-object case (a single prize), up to Pareto-indifference, there is only one selection from the no-envy solution satisfying the property. Such a solution always selects an envy-free allocation at which the winner of the prize is indifferent between his bundle and the losers’ common bundle. Received: 15 May 1995 / Accepted: 5 June 1996     

To File Or Not To File? Systemic Incentives, Corporate Control, and the Bankruptcy Decision

This research investigates the distinctions between bankrupt firms and equally leveraged firms that avoid bankruptcy. Building upon the systemic incentives of bankruptcy law, and specifically those applicable to Chapter 11 reorganizations, the study argues that the firm’s governance and capital structure characteristics moderate the relationship between the firm’s financial condition and the filing decision. The results of this study indicate that, contrary to agency theoretical predictions, firms with high levels of inside equity ownership and secured indebtedness file in poorer financial condition than peer firms with low levels of these variables. By contrast, firms with high levels of outside equity ownership and short-term indebtedness file when in relatively better financial condition.     

Goffman's legacy to political sociology

Conclusion I don't claim that Goffman addressed the questions that animate political sociologists. He was not interested in analyzing interaction to learn how it contributed to mobilization for collective action aimed at social change. He was not interested in changing political consciousness or in how the mass media and other social institutions make such change so difficult. But for those who are interested in such questions, he is worth heeding. His is an unanticipated bequest — from the cranky uncle who we always thought had no great love or admiration for our line of work.I have tried to show how Goffman's arguments about the nature of the interaction order and frame analysis can be applied to increase our understanding of micromobilization and political consciousness. The help here is concrete and empirical, aiding us in interpreting historical cases and guiding us in systematic research.But perhaps Goffman's most enduring legacy is in the moral stance that pervades his observations about social institutions. It goes beyond ideology, to the spirit of our intellectual pursuits. It is eloquently captured in words written after Goffman's death by the poet, Joseph BrodskyThe surest defense against Evil is extreme individualism, originality of thinking, whimsicality, even — if you will — eccentricity. That is, something that can't be feigned, faked, imitated; something even a seasoned impostor couldn't be happy with .... Evil is a sucker for solidity. It always goes for big numbers, for confident granite, for ideological purity, for drilled armies and balanced sheets. For Goffman, it was a lesson he knew and lived.

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