Setting aside mood-biased thoughts and judgements: theory-based bias correction / Apartar las opiniones y los pensamientos sesgados por el estado de ánimo: la corrección del sesgo basada en teoría

Abstract

When people perceive their thoughts and judgements as unduly affected by some biasing factor (in themselves or in the judgement setting), they often attempt to avoid or remove those biases. Theories describe different psychological mechanisms guiding these efforts. We review the primary theories of bias correction and focus on the use of naive theories of bias in attempts to form accurate assessments of judgement targets. One distinguishing feature of the theory-based correction approach is its ability to deal with corrections for contrastive biases (i.e., biases that lead judgements in a direction opposite to the meaning of the biasing factor). Another is that any perceived biasing factor can result in corrections, even when those factors are not easily mapped into the kinds of mental representation mechanisms that form the heart of alternative approaches. We use corrections for mood-based biases to illustrate the utility of the theory-based correction approach, even though many mood-based biases can be conceptualized in ways that fit alternative approaches to bias correction. Implications for correction of many potential types of biases are discussed.