Information Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure in an Export‐Processing System

We study a strategic information management problem in the export‐processing trade, where the buyer controls the raw material input and sales and the producer is responsible for production. The production is vulnerable to random yield risk. The producer can exert a costly effort to acquire the private yield rate information and discretionarily share it with the buyer. We develop a sequential Bayesian game model that captures three key features of the system—endogenous information endowment, voluntary disclosure, and ex post information sharing—a significant departure from the literature. The optimal disclosure strategy is driven by the trade‐off between the gains from Pareto efficiency improvement and self‐interested overproduction. It is specified by two thresholds on yield rate: only the middle‐yield producers (with yield rate between these two thresholds) share private information to improve supply‐demand match; the low‐ and high‐yield producers withhold information to extract excess input from the buyer. The buyer in response penalizes nondisclosure with reduced input and rewards information sharing with a larger order. This strategic interaction is further exacerbated by the double marginalization effect from decentralization, resulting in severe efficiency loss. We examine the effectiveness of three corrective mechanisms—vertical integration, mandatory disclosure, and production restriction—and reveal the costs of information suppressive effect and overinvestment incentive and the benefit from concessions on the processing fee. Our study endogenizes the asymmetric supply risk and provides the first attempt to rationalize the strategic interactions of informational and operational incentives in the export‐processing system.     

Optimal Inventory Control with Retail Pre‐Packs

A pre‐pack is a collection of items used in retail distribution. By grouping multiple units of one or more stock keeping units (SKU), distribution and handling costs can be reduced; however, ordering flexibility at the retail outlet is limited. This paper studies an inventory system at a retail level where both pre‐packs and individual items (at additional handling cost) can be ordered. For a single‐SKU, single‐period problem, we show that the optimal policy is to order into a “band” with as few individual units as possible. For the multi‐period problem with modular demand, the band policy is still optimal, and the steady‐state distribution of the target inventory position possesses a semi‐uniform structure, which greatly facilitates the computation of optimal policies and approximations under general demand. For the multi‐SKU case, the optimal policy has a generalized band structure. Our numerical results show that pre‐pack use is beneficial when facing stable and complementary demands, and substantial handling savings at the distribution center. The cost premium of using simple policies, such as strict base‐stock and batch‐ordering (pre‐packs only), can be substantial for medium parameter ranges.     

中国上市公司终极控制权及其与东亚、西欧上市公司的比较分析

本文运用终极产权论对上市公司的控股主体进行分类,通过追踪上市公司终极控制股东,发现在1260家样本公司中,终极控制股东拥有的控制权平均为43.67%,而其投入的现金流平均只有39.33%,就是说控制股东投入的现金流显著小于其获得的控制权,有4.34%的差异,两者的比值为0.890。在三种终极控制股东中,家族企业投入了相对较少的现金流量,却取得了相对较多的控制权,控制权和现金流量权的偏离达到了49.16%。同时,通过对中国上市公司和东亚、西欧国家的上市公司进行比较分析,得出了许多有意义的结论。     

基于顾客满意和顾客忠诚关系的市场细分方法研究

在顾客满意与顾客忠诚的相关关系方面,目前国内外许多学者都有不同的研究和看法。本研究认为,对于不同的顾客群体,顾客满意对顾客忠诚具有不同的影响,从而也为企业带来不一样的价值和利润。本研究尝试采用一种新的聚类回归方法,根据顾客满意和顾客忠诚的关系细分顾客群体,并以手机行业为例进行实证分析,探寻哪些顾客群体的满意度对忠诚度影响较高,哪些顾客群体其忠诚与否基本不受满意度的影响。     

不完全竞争环境下不对称企业技术创新战略投资

研究了在不完全竞争环境下,投资成本差异和创新成功所需时间对企业的技术创新战略投资决策的影响,给出了抢先均衡、序贯均衡、同时均衡出现的条件,指出创新成功所需时间和投资成本差异是影响均衡类型的主要原因.在抢先均衡和序贯均衡中,分析了投资成本差异和创新成功所需时间对企业平均投资时间间隔的影响,得到了一些有意义的结论,并给出了经济解释.     

新兴技术创新速度分析——一种实物期权方法

在创新采纳成本随时间下降的情况下,采用实物期权方法通过采纳企业投资决策对创新提供方的期望净收益的影响, 研究在快速变化的环境下最优的新兴技术创新速度.假设技术进步状态服从泊松过程,分析了创新采纳企业的3种投资策略.进一步通过比较创新提供方的期望净收益值的变化得到了最优的创新速度.最后,通过数字释例分析了几个重要参数的变化对创新提供企业期望净收益的影响.     

技能型合作的学习能力对合作绩效的影响

本文在综合研究国内外企业合作战略的基础上,使用聚类分析法,对152个合作企业的数据进行分析.本文对技能型合作企业强调学习能力的不同方面,对企业进行分类.分成强调学习能力的能力全面型、知识应用型、努力学习型和能力起步型等类别的技能合作型企业.四种类型企业的合作绩效,其成本、规模、学习效果等效应,要好于经营业绩、竞争优势及技术创新等效应.     

The Center Location Improvement Problem Under the Hamming Distance

In this paper, we consider the center location improvement problems under the sum-type and bottleneck-type Hamming distance. For the sum-type problem, we show that achieving an algorithm with a worst-case ratio of O(log |V|) is NP-hard, and for the bottleneck-type problem, we present a strongly polynomial algorithm.     

基于非理性行为的羊群效应分析:一个简单模型

本文在序贯交易的框架内用一个简单的模型分析了证券市场上的非理性交易行为怎样引起交易者之间的羊群行为。研究结论表明:若证券市场上所有的参与者完全理性且风险中性,则市场上不会出现羊群交易行为;相反,即便在一维不确定性下,交易者的非理性交易行为可能引起羊群效应。     

一种基于期权的供应商能力预订模型

在供应链中,合作企业实现风险共担,利益共享是供应链管理的基本目标。本文通过引入期权机制,提出了制造商预订上游供应商的生产能力的数学模型,使之能以较低的风险获取外部资源,以保证经营目标的实现。同时,也能使供应商通过期权降低自身的经营风险,增强收益的能力,最终实现供应链利益的整体协调。