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991.
Dynamic Measures of Individual Deprivation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We introduce a one-parameter class of individual deprivation measures. Motivated by a suggestion of Runciman, we modify Yitzhaki’s index by multiplying it by a function that is interpreted as measuring the part of deprivation generated by an agent’s observation that others in his reference group move on to a higher level of income than himself. The parameter reflects the relative weight given to these dynamic considerations, and the standard Yitzhaki index is obtained as a special case. In addition, we characterize more general classes of measures that pay attention to this important dynamic aspect of deprivation. 相似文献
992.
Psychology Implies Paternalism? Bounded Rationality may Reduce the Rationale to Regulate Risk-Taking 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Behavioral economists increasingly argue that violations of rationality axioms provide a new rationale for paternalism – to
“de-bias” individuals who exhibit errors, biases and other allegedly pathological psychological regularities associated with
Tversky and Kahneman’s (in Science 185:1124–1131, 1974) heuristics-and-biases program. The argument is flawed, however, in
neglecting to distinguish aggregate from individual rationality. The aggregate consequences of departures from normative decision-making
axioms may be Pareto-inferior or superior. Without a well-specified theory of aggregation, individual-level biases do not
necessarily imply losses in efficiency. This paper considers the problem of using a social-welfare function to decide whether
to regulate risk-taking behavior in a population whose individual-level behavior may or may not be consistent with expected
utility maximization. According to the social-welfare objective, unregulated aggregate risk distributions resulting from non-maximizing
behavior are often more acceptable (i.e., lead to a weaker rationale for paternalism) than population distributions generated
by behavior that conforms to the standard axioms. Thus, psychological theories that depart from axiomatic decision-making
norms do not necessarily strengthen the case for paternalism, and conformity with such norms is generally not an appropriate
policy-making objective in itself. 相似文献
993.
We characterize two different approaches to the idea of equality of opportunity. Roemer’s social ordering is motivated by
a concern to compensate for the effects of certain (non-responsibility) factors on outcomes. Van de gaer’s social ordering
is concerned with the equalization of the opportunity sets to which people have access. We show how different invariance axioms
open the possibility to go beyond the simple additive specification implied by both rules. This offers scope for a broader
interpretation of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. 相似文献
994.
We consider a decision board with representatives who vote on proposals on behalf of their constituencies. We look for decision
rules that realize utilitarian and (welfarist) egalitarian ideals. We set up a simple model and obtain roughly the following
results. If the interests of people from the same constituency are uncorrelated, then a weighted rule with square root weights
does best in terms of both ideals. If there are perfect correlations, then the utilitarian ideal requires proportional weights,
whereas the egalitarian ideal requires equal weights. We investigate correlations that are in between these extremes and provide
analytic arguments to connect our results to Barberà and Jackson (J Polit Econ 114(2):317–339, 2006) and to Banzhaf voting
power. 相似文献
995.
Robert C. Powers 《Social Choice and Welfare》2007,28(3):363-373
If an anonymous rule f always outputs a transitive relation and satisfies Pareto, then, by Arrow’s theorem, f violates the condition of independence. We give lower and upper bounds for the number of times an anonymous rule violates
independence in the case of three alternatives and three voters. 相似文献
996.
Sven Ove Hansson 《Social Choice and Welfare》2007,29(4):649-663
There has been very little contact between risk studies and more general studies of social decision processes. It is argued
that as a consequence of this, an oversimplified picture of social decision processes prevails in studies of risk. Tools from
decision theory, welfare economics, and moral theory can be used to analyze the intricate inter-individual relationships that
need to be treated in an adequate account of social decision-making about risk. However, this is not a matter of simple or
straightforward application of existing theory. It is a challenging area for new theoretical developments. 相似文献
997.
In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows
both anonymity and neutrality. 相似文献
998.
Timothy J. Keaveny Edward J. Inderrieden Peter G. Toumanoff 《Journal of Labor Research》2007,28(2):327-346
We conduct a comprehensive examination of the gender differences in pay focusing on multiple perspectives emanating from economics, social psychology, and gender studies. Data are drawn from surveys of MBA students conducted by the Graduate Management Admissions Council. Although women in both samples earn significantly less on average than men, when the effects of the study's variables are considered via multiple regression analysis, no significant difference in annual salary is observed. Our results show the importance of simultaneously considering the impact of human capital, job and firm characteristics, demographics, and cognitive skills. Structural differences are noted in the models estimated separately for men and women. However, the results from decomposing salary differentials are quite consistent with estimates from the single-equation models. 相似文献
999.
The Nature and Consequences of Organization-Employee and Union-Member Exchange: An Empirical Analysis 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Drawing on a study of 423 union members in a UK Primary Care Trust, we use structural equation modeling to investigate the extent to which organizational and union commitment and citizenship behaviors are a function of economic and social exchange. Findings suggest that the organization-employee and union-member exchanges are distinct, with organizational commitment a function of organization-employee exchange and union commitment and citizenship behaviors (UCB) a function of union-member exchange. Findings also suggest that union commitment and UCB are motivated primarily by social exchange, with economic exchange playing a supporting role. In addition, for organizational commitment, social exchange also seemed to be relatively more important. There was no evidence that perceived industrial relations climate moderates these relationships. Implications for industrial relations and workplace social partnerships are considered. 相似文献
1000.